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There is growing clamor in industrial countries for additional border taxes on imports from countries with 
lower carbon prices. A key factor affecting the impact of these taxes is whether they are based on the carbon 
content of imports or the carbon content in domestic production. Our quantitative estimates suggest that the 
former action when applied to all merchandise imports would address competitiveness and environmental 
concerns in high income countries but with serious consequences for trading partners. For example, China’s 
manufacturing exports would decline by one-fifth and those of all low- and middle-income countries by 8 
percent; the corresponding declines in real income would be 3.7 percent and 2.4 percent. In contrast, border 
tax adjustment based on the carbon content in domestic production, especially if applied to both imports and 
exports, would broadly address the competitiveness concerns of producers in high income countries without 
seriously damaging developing-country trade. Therefore, as part of a comprehensive agreement on climate 
change, new WTO rules could be negotiated that would prohibit the extreme form of action while possibly 
allowing trade actions based on domestic carbon content as a safety valve.  
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If countries cut emissions by different amounts, carbon prices are likely to differ across 
countries. Countries with higher carbon prices may seek to impose additional border 
taxes on imports from countries with lower carbon prices for two reasons. They may wish 
to offset the competitiveness disadvantage to their firms and the ―leakage‖ of carbon 
emissions in the form of increased production in countries with lower carbon prices.   
 
A key issue in the run-up to Copenhagen is therefore the scope for trade policy actions in 
any climate change agreement. The internationally-minded US Senator John Kerry and 
the free trade-oriented Senator Graham wrote recently in the New York Times that, 
 
“.. we cannot sacrifice another job to competitors overseas. China and India are among 
the many countries investing heavily in clean-energy technologies that will produce 
millions of jobs. There is no reason we should surrender our marketplace to countries 
that do not accept environmental standards. For this reason, we should consider a 
border tax on items produced in countries that avoid these standards. This is consistent 
with our obligations under the World Trade Organization and creates strong incentives 
for other countries to adopt tough environmental protections.” 
 
Indeed, the eponymous legislation that these two senators are shepherding through 
Congress provides for such trade actions. President Nicholas Sarkozy of France joined 
the charge when he said, ―We need to impose a carbon tax at [Europe‘s] borders. I will 
lead that battle.‖  Nobel-prize winning trade economist, Paul Krugman issued his own 
endorsement, arguing that carbon taxes at the border are ―a matter of leveling the playing 
field, not protectionism.‖ And the WTO itself has given a cautious nod: "Rules permit, 
under certain conditions, the use of border tax adjustments on imported and exported 
products,‖ says an appropriately guarded report, jointly issued by the trade body and the 
United Nations Environmental Program. 
 
What is the likely impact of these measures? And how should they be optimally 
designed? These are the questions addressed in this paper. 
 
Most of the existing literature focuses on the consequences for the industrial countries of 
unilateral emissions reductions and/or offsetting trade actions.  The studies on the United 
States (Fischer and Fox, 2009; Ho et. al., 2008, Houser et. al., 2008) and the European 
Union (Aldy and Pizer, 2008; Grubb and Niehoff, 2006; Peterson and Schleich, 2007; 
Ponssard and Walker, 2008; Quirion and Demailly, 2006; Reinaud, 2005) typically 
examine two outcomes: the overall emissions reductions—the so-called leakage issue; 
and the impact on producers of energy-intensive goods in rich countries—the so-called 
competitiveness issue. The broad findings are that unilateral actions lead to relatively 
small leakage in terms of aggregate emissions.   However, there can be larger emissions 
and competitiveness effects in some sectors, for example, cement, steel, and aluminum, 
which can be partially offset through trade actions. However, these papers do not 
quantify the impact of these trade actions on developing countries. 
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In contrast, Atkinson et. al. (2009) adopt a more global approach and calculate the 
effective tariff that exporting countries would face on their goods if all importing 
countries placed a small domestic emissions tax. However, even this study does not 
measure the resulting trade and output consequences. In general, few studies have 
adopted a global approach in trying to quantify simultaneously the effects on emissions, 
as well as sectoral exports and output of all countries, industrial and developing.   
 
Hence, for many of the vital policy questions that are the subject of this paper, there are 
today no good answers based on empirical research. An econometric approach seems 
handicapped by the absence of past events, and our inability to construct experiments, 
which are comparable with the policy changes of greatest interest.  We therefore use a 
multi-country, multi-sector CGE model to derive our quantitative estimates. In situations 
of simultaneous climate and trade policy changes of the kind that we consider in this 
paper, in which there could be significant interaction among the policies of different 
countries, and where we are interested in quantifying the effects of policy change on 
output and trade in different sectors of the economy, a computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) approach seems appropriate (Kehoe et. al., 2005).   
 
The main empirical findings are the following. In a differentiated carbon price regime, 
there will be strong pressure in the industrial countries to take trade actions against 
countries that set low carbon prices. Environmental concerns cannot be the basis for such 
actions because ―leakage‖—increases in emissions in poor countries as a result of 
emission tightening in the rich—will be low. Given the stated level of ambition in the US 
and EU on unilateral emission reductions –17 per cent cuts relative to 2005 levels by 
2020, the increase in emissions in low and middle income countries will be about 1 
percent.  Rather, the pressure will emanate from domestic producers of energy-intensive 
manufactures who will witness erosion in their competitiveness, reflected in export and 
output declines, which in the US could amount to 12 and 4 per cent, respectively. 
 
A country which has imposed a tax on carbon emissions domestically (or equivalently 
introduced a domestic cap-and-trade scheme) can impose a tax on imports either based on 
the carbon content of domestic production or based on the carbon content embodied in 
imports. 
 
Our estimates show that imposing tariffs across-the-board based on the carbon content of 
imports would address competitiveness concerns of domestic producers and contribute to 
further emissions reductions. But it would be a ―nuclear option‖ in terms of trade 
consequences.  For example, such an action by the US and EU would be the equivalent of 
imposing a tariff of over 20 percent on China and India, resulting in lost exports of up to 
20 percent. 
 
The second option of a trade action based on the carbon content in domestic production if 
applied symmetrically on exports and imports would allow energy-intensive producers in 
rich countries to regain most of the competitiveness that they stand to lose from 
emissions reductions action.  The trade consequences of this option for developing 
countries would be less serious.  The second option would, therefore, be the least harmful 2 
 
of possible border tax adjustments from a trade and developing country perspective 
though still inferior to no border tax adjustment. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. In section II, we describe some recent initiatives on 
trade actions in the context of climate change legislation and the WTO status of such 
actions. In section III, we spell out the scenarios that underlie our empirical analysis.  
Section IV describes the simple analytics of emissions reductions, international 
tradability of emissions and transfers. In section V, we present the results of our 
quantitative analysis. In Section VI, we discuss the implications of our results for the 




II.  Recent Initiatives on Trade Actions and Their WTO status 
 
The United States Congress has seen two recent legislative initiatives which create scope 
for some form of trade policy actions. The most recent, which is still being debated in the 
Senate (Boxer-Kerry), has a general provision that calls for border tax adjustments 
consistent with WTO provisions. This is not precise because the interpretation of existing 
WTO provisions is itself not settled. Greater specificity on border tax adjustments has 
been provided in a bill already passed by the House of Representatives (Waxman-
Markey) which contains two kinds of provisions with potential trade impacts.  
 
First, the bill contemplates the grant of free emission allowances to certain energy-
intensive and/or trade-intensive industries (which are likely to include iron and steel, 
paper and paperboard, rubber manufacturing, plastics, organic and inorganic chemicals, 
and petrochemicals). The amount of allowances would depend roughly on the sector‘s 
output, its carbon intensity and the additional ―tax‖ created by the emissions cuts. There 
are two ways of interpreting these allowances. If the allowances are related to historical 
output (it has been proposed that they be related to output in the previous two years), then 
they would amount to a lump-sum transfer without any marginal impact on production 
decisions, and hence on trade. Alternatively, producers‘ knowledge that future 
allowances are related to current output could have an impact on current decisions on 
output. In this case, allowances would be closer to a production subsidy.  But it is 
important to note that in either case the magnitude of the allowance would be related to 
carbon intensity in domestic production. 
 
Second, the bill would require importers in certain sectors (based on the same eligibility 
criteria as for emission allowances) to purchase emission allowances at the going market 
price. This measure would be equivalent to a border tax adjustment because it would 
serve to raise the price of imports.
1 But the magnitude of the border tax would depend on 
                                                 
1 Another form of ―border tax adjustment‖ would be to enact an energy-performance or energy-intensity 
standard for certain products (say, a ton of steel cannot have a carbon-footprint of more than x tons of CO2) 
and impose that standard on both domestic steel and imported steel (Pauwelyn, 2009).  3 
 
whether the purchase of allowances must cover the actual carbon content of imports or 
the carbon content in comparable domestic output.
2   
 
In the EU, no clear policy initiatives have so far been taken in relation to border tax 
adjustments. But the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, has recently called for countries 
in the European Union to adopt carbon taxes and to impose adjustments at the border for 
these taxes. In his view, the idea was now "progressing" among EU leaders "because it is 
more and more understood, not as a protectionist measure," but as a way to "rebalance the 
conditions of free-trade and competition…Otherwise, it is a massive aid to relocations. 
We cannot tax European companies and exempt others."
3  Lord Turner, Chairman of the 
United Kingdom‘s Committee on Climate Change, while noting that the distribution of 
free carbon permits to affected companies had for the time being addressed 
competitiveness concerns, has stated that border tax adjustment might be a better solution 
in future.  ―Looking forward, we should keep an open mind about the two approaches.‖
4 
 
What about the WTO-consistency of these possible trade actions? WTO law and 
jurisprudence are evolving and not completely clear on what types of actions would be 
legitimate. The legality of both the free allowances and the border tax adjustments 
contemplated under the recent US bills is open (see Hufbauer et. al. 2009; Pauwelwyn, 
2009, Bhagwati and Mavroidis, 2007, and WTO, 2009, among others for a thoughtful 
examination of the legal implications of possible trade actions).  
 
If free emissions allowances are designed to simulate a pure transfer without any effect 
on marginal production decisions, they would probably not be inconsistent with the 
WTO. On the other hand, if they are designed to affect such marginal decisions, they 
could constitute a trade-distorting production subsidy. Unlike export subsidies, 
production subsidies per se are not prohibited by WTO rules (see Part II of the WTO 
Agreement on Subsides and Countervailing Measures (SCM) and Pauwelyn, 2009). 
Production subsidies are, however, actionable, including in the form of countervailing 
import duties by partner countries (See Part III of the WTO‘s SCM Agreement). 
However, legitimate action requires the fulfillment of a number of conditions, including 
demonstration of injury to a domestic industry (see part V of the WTO‘s SCM 
Agreement).   
 
The WTO issue on border tax adjustments relates to the basic national treatment principle 
in Article III of GATT (1994). This Article clearly permits the imposition on imports of 
domestic indirect taxes provided the taxes on imports are no higher than the taxes levied 
                                                 
2 This requirement on importers would kick in for imports originating in countries that are not part of a 
future climate change agreement or that have not signed sector-specific agreements with the United States. 
The requirement would become effective from 2017 and seems to be the default option unless the President 
intervenes to waive it. The Waxman-Markey and Boxer-Kerry bills both call for this de facto border tax 
provision to take into account the free emission allowances that are granted under the provision described 
above. Presumably, this is to avoid producers in selected sectors from double-dipping—benefiting from the 
de facto subsidies under the free allowance provision and from the border tax adjustment on imports.  
3  See http://www.euractiv.com/en/climate-change/france-germany-call-eu-border-tax-co2/article-
185580?Ref=RSS. 
4 See ―EU attacks carbon border tax initiative,‖ Financial Times, October 15, 2009. 4 
 
on comparable domestic products. Under the WTO panel ruling in the Superfund case, 
indirect taxes levied on domestic inputs could also be imposed on imports provided these 
inputs were embodied in the final product (see WTO, 2009). However, there is no WTO 
jurisprudence on whether such adjustments are permissible for inputs (such as energy) 
that are used in production but are not themselves incorporated in the final product.
5  
 
It is less clear that even if such border tax adjustments were permitted at what level they 
could be set and whether they should be based on the carbon content of domestic 
production or foreign production. Even if there is a presumption in favor of the latter 
interpretation, there will be important practical considerations that might favor the 
former.  Moreover, on scope, if border tax adjustments are permitted at all, there would 
be no constraints on the types of products on which they could be applied. Therefore in 
our empirical analysis below, we consider the effect of taxes which differ both in their 
basis (i.e. domestic or foreign carbon content) and in their scope (on imports of all 




III.  Scenarios  
 
To compare the quantitative implications of recent initiatives, we constructed a set of 
scenarios (see Table 1). The benchmark scenario involves unilateral emissions reductions 
by high income countries, amounting to a 17 percent cut by 2020 relative to emissions 
levels in 2005. This scenario—NBTA17—is close to the unilateral cuts announced by the 
EU and the US (for example, the Boxer-Kerry bill calls for a 20 percent cut by 2020).  
We assume that low and middle income countries do not undertake any emissions 
reductions.  Modeling cuts also by these countries is feasible but adds little to the 
analysis. While this 17 percent cut is the base case scenario, we examine the robustness 
of our results to a wide range of emissions cuts by the US and EU, ranging from 5 
percent to 40 percent. 
 
                                                 
5 Rules on export subsidies do, however, state that rebates based on energy ―consumed‖ in the process of 
producing goods for exports will not be deemed to be export subsidies (See Annex I of the WTO‘s SCM 
Agreement). One argument could be that by symmetry comparable border tax adjustments should be 
permitted on the import side.  
6 There is a another option, which would be qualitatively different from those described above, in that it 
would punitively target all imports from countries with lower carbon prices and not necessarily be based on 
carbon content. The aim of such actions would be to attempt to change policies relating to carbon 
abatement across the board. These actions would be responding less to domestic trade concerns than to 
global environmental concerns. But this option would only be legitimate if it could be justified under the 
WTO‘s exceptions provisions in XX (b) or XX(g) relating respectively to measures necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health and measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources.  Here we are very much in the murky waters of the WTO shrimp turtle case (see Pauwelyn, 
2009). What WTO jurisprudence, notably in this case, has established is the permissibility of national trade 
policy action to protect the global environment (i.e., to address cross-border externalities). However, this 
right comes attached with a number of conditions that must be met, including the requirement that such 
action be ―necessary,‖ to achieve the objective. Recent interpretations of the necessity test have required 
the exhaustion of other reasonable means—notably international cooperation--of attaining the 
environmental objective. 5 
 
To depict the alternatives being considered in EU and US legislation, we model three 
broad policy options. The first option is a border tax adjustment based on the carbon 
content embodied in the domestically produced good in the importing country; we call 
this BTADU.
7 Thus, if the US has a CO2 tax of say $60 per ton, and the direct and 
indirect CO2 content in car production in the United States is 10 tons, the US could apply 
a CO2 tax of $600 on the imports of cars.  
 
The second option is a similar tax adjustment except that it is based on the carbon content 
embodied in imports, BTAFU. In the same example, if the direct and indirect CO2 
content in Indian car production is 20 tons, the US could apply a CO2 tax of $1200 on the 
imports of cars from India.
8   
 
A third option would be to combine a border tax adjustment on imports with a similar 
border tax adjustment on exports thus relieving exporters also of the burden of taxes on 
carbon, which we call scenario BTADE. Since export rebates would have to be based on 
the carbon content in domestic production, consistency would require that in this 
scenario, the tax adjustment on imports is also based on the carbon content in domestic 
production. 
 
The BTADU scenario can be seen as representing an upper bound on the trade impacts of 
the US (and EU) free emission allowances program.  As discussed earlier, this program 
could either have no effects on output and trade or act like a production subsidy. The 
BTADU scenario involves a tax on imports, which is the sum of a production subsidy and 
consumption tax, and will overstate the effect of the allowance program. What makes 
BTADU comparable with the production subsidy variant of the free allowance program is 
that the basis for the assistance is the carbon intensity in domestic production. 
 
The BTAFU scenario can be seen as reflecting border tax adjustment under the provision 
in draft US legislation requiring importers to buy emission allowances equal to the 
carbon content of imports, as well as under the proposals of the French president. 
Analytically, this is a border tax based on how much production costs in the source 
(developing) country would have increased if it had imposed an identical carbon tax.  
 
The US and EU legislative initiatives do not explicitly provide for the BTADE option, 
involving export rebates of carbon taxes. This probably reflects the concerns of 
environmentalists: it would be odd to be taking action on environmental grounds and yet 
exempt some part of domestic production (namely, exports) from carbon taxes. But it is 
important to consider this policy option. The options in BTADU and BTAFU are 
theoretically problematic because they do not create neutral incentives between imports 
and exports and involve a tax on trade. As Grossman (1982) argued, neutrality in indirect 
taxes such as the VAT could be achieved only if border tax adjustments are symmetric 
between imports and exports.  
                                                 
7 Note that in all the border tax scenarios, we assume that the adjustment is based on the total carbon 
content (i.e. direct and indirect), data on which are shown in Table 4. 
8 As is evident from this example, border tax adjustments based on carbon content in imports could vary 
based on the source of imports.   6 
 
 
While these are the four main scenarios we will examine in detail, we need to deal with 
another set of possibilities. As currently drafted, US legislation envisages relief mainly 
for producers in energy-intensive sectors, which include chemicals, paper, ferrous metals, 
non-ferrous metals, and mineral products. But in the four main scenarios, we assume that 
border tax adjustments are applied on all merchandise imports. We do so to highlight the 
analytics of the various policy options and also because the application of border taxes 
across-the-board cannot be ruled out either in the US or EU. However, we will also 
discuss briefly the consequences of restricting these adjustments only to imports of 




IV.  The Simple analytics of unilateral emissions reduction and trade policy 
actions 
 
We can think of emissions (E) as an input to the production of a single composite 
commodity with a simple production function which is assumed to be given over the 
relatively short horizon that we consider in this paper.
 9 
 
We depict the equilibrium for the world in Figure 1.  V and V
* represent the value of 
marginal products of emissions (i.e., the price of the output times the marginal physical 
product of emissions) for the two groups of countries, say the poor and rich, respectively. 
Emissions are measured from the origin O for the poor country and O* for the rich 
countries. In the pre-emissions situation, we assume that the price of emissions is zero in 
both groups of countries. In each group the equilibrium is where the marginal benefit of 
emissions equals the zero price of emissions. This occurs at E, resulting in an initial level 
of world emissions of OO
*, with OE the emissions level of the poor and O*E, the 
emissions level of the rich.  
 
We assume that only rich countries take actions to reduce emissions. Thus, the origin for 
measuring their emissions shifts inward from O
* to O1
* and the value of marginal product 
to V1
*. The price of emissions rises to P1
* in the rich countries and remains at zero in the 
poor countries. In this case, rich country output declines and rich country firms become 
less competitive because of their increased costs. This can be depicted as a rightward 
shift in the value of marginal product curve for poor countries to V1 because they would 
now receive a higher price for their output. We can therefore think of the output declines 
of the rich countries and the expansion of output in the poor countries as together 
constituting the competitiveness consequences of unilateral emissions reductions action 






                                                 
9 See e.g. Panagariya (2009). 7 
 




In order to illustrate the impact on global emissions, we depict this rightward shift of the 
V curve and the corresponding increase in poor country emissions by moving the origin 
for the rich countries to O2
*. Note that this shift represents the leakage effect: while rich 
countries reduce their emissions by O
*O1
*, some of it is offset as poor countries increase 
their emissions by EE1 (=O1
*O2




What about the impact of trade action by rich countries on emissions and output in the 
poor countries?  Essentially, if rich countries impose a tariff on exports from poor 
countries, the effect is akin to depressing the price they receive for their output. In the 
figure this can be shown as a leftward shift from V1 to V2 of the value of marginal product 
curve for poor countries. However, in order to capture the emissions impact of this, we 
show this as a leftward shift of the origin for rich countries from O2
* to O3
*.  So with 
trade action, as rich countries reduce their emissions by O
*O1
*, poor countries also reduce 
their emissions by EE2 (=O1
*O3
*), so the global reduction in emissions is greater at O
*O3
*.  
Clearly, the magnitude of these shifts will depend on the severity of trade restrictions to 
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V.  Quantification of the impact of unilateral emissions reduction and trade    
policy actions 
 
For many of the vital policy questions that are the subject of this paper, there are today no 
good answers based on empirical research. An econometric approach seems handicapped 
by the absence of past events and our inability to construct experiments which are 
comparable with the policy changes of greatest interest.  In situations of simultaneous 
policy changes of the kind that we consider in this paper, in which there could be 
significant interaction effects among different countries, and where we are interested in 
quantifying the effects of these changes on output and trade in different sectors of the 
economy, a computable general equilibrium (CGE) approach seems appropriate (Kehoe 
et. al., 2005).   
 
The quantitative results presented in this paper rely on a specific CGE model that has 
been developed at the World Bank, known as the Environmental Impact and 
Sustainability Applied General Equilibrium Model, or the ENVISAGE model.
10 The 
primary purpose of the ENVISAGE model is to assess the growth and structural impacts 
for developing countries from climate change itself and policies to address climate 
change—either unilaterally or in an international agreement.  
 
Any quantitative analysis in this field will conditional on assumptions regarding 
exogenous developments (for example the future cost of alternative technologies), key 
parameter values (for example intra-fuel substitution elasticities) and model specification 
(for example carbon tax revenue recycling). Our quantitative exercise is meant to be 
illustrative of the signs and broad magnitudes of effects, rather than be taken as definitive 
in any way.  The reader should nonetheless keep in mind certain caveats regarding the 
model and its results.  
 
First, and foremost, the model is not equipped to quantify any of the welfare benefits 
from emissions reductions per se and does not take account of emissions related to 
forestry. 
 
Second, the modeling does not take into account any pre-existing subsidies or other 
distortions in developing country energy markets whose elimination could provide 
opportunities for emission abatement.  The OECD (2009) has calculated the fuel 
subsidies in a number of developing economies. Most of these are consumption rather 
than production subsidies and, although they vary across fuel types and income groups, 
their average value is relatively low (for example, less than 3 percent for China). This 
suggests that eliminating these subsidies will have positive welfare consequences that our 
results do not incorporate. However, the fact that the magnitudes are low would suggest 
that our results relating to compositional changes may not be significantly affected. 
                                                 
10 The model has several distinguishing features: a focus on developing countries and significant sectoral 
disaggregation; an integrated climate module that generates changes in global mean temperature based on 
emissions of four greenhouse gases; and economic damage functions linked to changes in temperature. A 
summary description of the model and the key assumptions are provided in the Technical Appendix and 
van der Mensbrugghe (2009) provides a full description of the model. 9 
 
 
Third, the model is not able to represent the full range of available alternative 
technologies, and so may tend to exaggerate the output and trade responses as energy 
prices rise with emission limits.  But some features of the model may limit the biases on 
this score.  We allow for exogenous improvements in manufacturing energy efficiency 
through the accumulation of more advanced capital stock.  Also, the current version of 
the ENVISAGE model does allow for limited substitution between technologies. For 
example, it allows for switching to alternative (and cleaner) technologies in the power 
sector, albeit in limited fashion.
11  The model also allows for some substitution to natural 
gas in the transportation sector but not to biofuels and only to a limited extent to 
electricity (to the extent some modes of public transportation already rely on electricity).  
 
The limited possibilities for technological substitution may not be unrealistic given that 
our horizon is relatively short-term: we are projecting economic magnitudes for 2020, 
about ten years out from today. Also, the emission taxes and the consequential price 
changes in our model are relatively small.  For example, in the most extreme scenario, 
when both high and low income countries reduce emissions, the overall price of energy 
rises by 41 percent in China and 26 percent in India. These prices are not large enough to 
induce large technology switching responses. For example, Birdsall and Subramanian 
(2009) find that it took the oil price shock of the 1970s—which involved a quadrupling of 
energy prices—to induce a small response in energy efficiency in production and even 
more modest response on the consumption side.  
 
We describe first the benchmark scenario where high income countries make unilateral 
emission reductions and then turn to the implications of trade policy action. 
 
No trade policy actions 
 
In the benchmark scenario, which we call the NBTA (no border tax adjustment), we 
assume that after 2012, a carbon tax is imposed in OECD countries to achieve a 17% cut 
of total OECD carbon emission by 2020 (relative to the 2005 level).   
 
                                                 
11 The current electricity technologies include five activities—coal, oil and gas, hydro, nuclear and other 
(essentially renewable). The five activities are aggregated together to ‗generate‘ a single electricity 
commodity distributed to households and producers. The ‗aggregator‘ (for example the electricity 
distribution sector) chooses the least cost supplier subject to a CES aggregation function (that is calibrated 
to base year shares). Thus the coal producer will see a decline in demand relative to other producers—
particularly hydro, nuclear and other—when subject to the carbon tax. The amount of the shift will depend 
on both the overall demand elasticity as well as the base year share. In the current baseline, these shares are 
fixed at base year levels. It is clear that there are non-price factors that are pushing these shares in one 
direction or another and we are witnessing rapid rises (from a very low base) in renewable technologies 
(notably wind and solar). In the model, and in reality, expansion of hydro is limited to physical potential. 
We make no effort to model changes in the share of nuclear power. In addition, the model ignores one 
potentially significant change in power generation and that is the introduction of carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) for coal and gas powered thermal plants. However, CCS is unlikely to become a major technology 
before 2020 (though its anticipation could affect investment decisions in the near term). CCS may also be a 
feasible technology in some other fossil-fuel dependent sectors such as cement and iron and steel 
production. 10 
 
We first focus on the competitiveness effects in industrial countries. The quantitative 
impacts are summarized in Table 2.
12 The imposition of a carbon tax by OECD countries 
can be expected to curtail domestic output of all carbon-intensive goods and services, 
ranging from coal, oil and natural gas to electricity, but competitiveness effects will be 
felt most sharply in the case of tradable goods like chemicals and plastics, paper products, 
minerals like cement, ferrous and non-ferrous metals.  Table 2 confirms that the impact of 
unilateral emissions reductions by the rich countries will lead to an increase in imports 
and decline in the exports and output of the US and EU. For example, exports of energy-
intensive manufacturing goods decline by 12 percent in the US and 5 percent in the EU, 
whereas output of these goods declines by 4 percent in the US and by 2 per cent in the 
EU. The effects are greater in the US than the EU because both energy and carbon 
intensity of these sectors in the US is nearly double that in the EU (Table 4).  This also 
helps understand why calls for trade action at the border are more insistent in the US than 
the EU. 
 
Since developing countries do not impose comparable taxes, the action by the high 
income countries leads to increased imports of carbon intensive products from countries 
like Brazil, China and India, which therefore see an expansion in exports of these 
products of about 6-8 per cent.  However, what matters for emissions is the impact on 
these countries‘ overall output and its composition.  Since exports are a small proportion 
of output, the increase in output of carbon intensive sectors in Brazil, China and India, is 
only about 1-2 per cent (Appendix Table 5).  Furthermore, this expansion pulls resources 
out of other sectors, which has an offsetting effect on emissions even though these latter 
sectors are less carbon intensive.  As a result, the ―leakage‖ effect is quite small–the 
emissions in low and middle income countries are only 1 per cent higher than business-
as-usual levels (Table 3). For example, China‘s emissions increase from 3679 to 
3700MtC and India‘s from 805 to 811 MtC. Thus, given the assumptions of our model, 
the limited unilateral action envisaged by high income countries to reduce their carbon 
emissions will not in and of itself lead to a large increase in emissions in poor countries.
13 
 
Impact of trade policy actions based on carbon content in domestic production 
 
Despite the limited leakage effect, there is likely to be pressure on industrial countries – 
e.g. from their own-energy intensive industries which will face serious competitive 
pressures, as our estimates indicate--to take trade policy actions, most likely in the form 
of additional border taxes on imports from countries that do not tax emissions at 
comparable levels.   
 
BTADU involves a border tax applied on all imported products equivalent to that 
imposed on the carbon content in the like domestic product. The effects of such a tax on 
                                                 
12 In the text, we focus on the impact on selected countries—US, EU, China, India, and Brazil—and 
selected groups—high income and low and middle income. More disaggregated impacts and other data are 
presented in Appendix Tables 2-8. 
13 Of course, this result, like all others, is conditional on the supply/demand elasticities of our GE model. 
For a comparison of our results with those of other models, see the section on ―Unilateral Action and 
Leakage‖ in the Technical Appendix.   
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output and exports in the industrial countries imposing this tariff are summarized in Table 
2. The average tax across all goods is about 3-5 per cent, but the level is a little higher on 
energy-intensive goods 6-8 (Table 5).  This import tax dampens the adverse output and 
trade consequences of the carbon tax increase for industrial countries.  For example, 
imports of energy-intensive goods now decline by 4.6 percent (compared to a 3.5 percent 
increase without import action) in the US and output of such goods declines by 3.6 
percent compared with a 4.4 percent decline without offsetting trade action (Table 2).  
 
The impact on developing countries in the BTADU scenario is summarized in Table 6. 
Changes in welfare and output of low and middle income countries are less than one 
percent and exports decline by around 3 percent.   
 
Impact of trade policy actions based on carbon content in imports 
 
More disruptive trade action would involve border tax adjustments based on the carbon 
content in imports and applied to all manufacturing sectors (BTAFU). Note first that such 
an action would address both competitiveness and environmental concerns in industrial 
countries. Manufacturing output in energy-intensive industries in the US would now 
decline only by 2.5 percent and in the EU it would actually increase by 1.8 percent. These 
effects are not now concentrated only in energy intensive manufacturing but spread out 
over the entire manufacturing sector.  As a result, the effects on aggregate manufacturing 
in high income countries are positive, resulting in an increase in output. Under this 
scenario, low and middle income countries‘ emissions would also decline by 1.5 percent 
as against the zero impact when actions are based on the carbon content of domestic 
production. 
 
These outcomes in the high income countries would come at a huge cost for developing 
country trading partners. Since production in countries like China and India is much more 
carbon-intensive than in OECD countries, import taxes on all manufactured goods in the 
BTAFU scenario are much higher than in the BTADU scenario – an average tariff on 
manufactured goods imports from China of about 26 percent and from India of about 20 
per cent (Table 5).
14  
 
As a result, for China, aggregate manufacturing exports decline by about 21 per cent, and 
for India, by 16 per cent, and manufacturing output by close to 3.5 percent in both 
countries (Table 6). Brazil is much less affected because its exports are far less carbon-
intensive.  
 
The impact in welfare is also significant.  Whereas the BTADU scenario would have 
smaller effects on welfare in China, India and all low and middle income countries, the 
BTAFU scenario would reduce welfare in these countries by, respectively, 3.7, 1.4 and 
2.4 per cent (Table 6). 
 
                                                 
14 Production could be relatively carbon intensive in developing countries for these broad GTAP categories 
both because individual products are produced more carbon-intensively and because the broad product 
categories include more carbon-intensive products. 12 
 
Thus, trade policy actions based on the carbon content of imports applied to all imports 
would have substantial effects.   
 
 
Impact of trade policy actions based on carbon content in domestic production but 
applied to imports and exports 
 
Recall that border tax adjustments in the BTADU scenarios are akin to a tariff on 
imports. Trade theory suggests that a tax on imports is also a tax on exports and so this 
type of adjustment taxes trade twice, and is likely to be inefficient. From Grossman 
(1982) and Lockwood and Whalley (2008), we know that the way to eliminate the 
distortion would be to have symmetric tax adjustments so that the indirect tax burden on 
exports is also relieved. We call this the efficient border tax (BTADE). 
 
Efficient border taxes (BTADE) will allay the competitiveness concerns in industrial 
countries to a greater degree than the corresponding tax adjustment applied only to 
imports (BTADU).  This is not surprising because in these countries, exporters‘ 
competitiveness is also improved. Thus, energy-intensive manufacturing sectors in the 
US witness a decline in output of 0.8 percent under BTADE compared with 1.2 percent 
in BTADU. In the EU, BTADE actually allows a more than full claw-back of 
competitiveness losses for energy-intensive producers because output increases by 1 
percent compared with a 0.2 percent decline in the BTADU scenario.
15  
 
The impact on developing county trade is also unambiguously smaller under BTADE 
(and of course much smaller than under the BTAFU scenario) than under BTADU. For 
example, manufacturing exports of China and India decline by 1.8 percent and 2.1 
percent respectively in the BTADE scenario compared with 3.4 and 3.2 percent, 
respectively in the BTADU scenario. This seems to be in accordance with the Grossman 
result (1982) that the BTADU border adjustment taxes trade and hence shrinks trading 
opportunities also for partner countries.
16   
 
A symmetric border tax adjustment would also be superior to the alternatives (BTAFU 
and BTADU) from a global efficiency perspective. We know that trade actions based on 
carbon content in imports imply a very high tariff and hence lead to large global 
efficiency losses of 1 percent.  Under BTADE and BTADU, welfare declines are nearly 
halved, with BTADE being superior to BTADU. Global welfare declines by 0.52 percent 
in the former and by 0.58 percent in the latter. Global emissions also decline marginally 
more in the BTADE scenario (10 percent) than in the BTADU scenario (9.8 percent).
17  
                                                 
15In fact, efficient border tax adjustment (BTADE) addresses the competitiveness concerns of the energy-
intensive sectors in some high income countries such as the US even more effectively than the drastic 
action in the BTAFU scenario. The reason is that the output benefits of export rebates are greater than of 
further increases in tariffs.  
16 However, the BTADE scenario is not superior to the BTADU scenario for developing countries‘ 
manufacturing output.  
17 Another way of understanding the BTADE scenario is as a consumption tax on emissions, and the no 
border tax adjustment scenario (NBTA17) as a pure production tax on emissions. Global welfare decline is 
marginally lower in the NBTA scenario compared with BTADE scenario (0.49 percent versus 0.52 percent) 13 
 
 
The foregoing discussion suggests that from the perspectives of political economy in 
industrial countries, trade interests of developing countries and of global efficiency, 
symmetric and efficient border tax adjustment (BTADE) is the least undesirable 
alternative.  
 
Impact of trade policy actions based on their product coverage 
 
Thus far, we have examined the impacts of trade actions applied to all merchandise 
imports. What if they are only applied to energy-intensive imports? It turns out that if 
border taxes were applied only to energy-intensive imports, they would broadly achieve 
the goals of minimizing the adverse competitiveness effects in industrial countries from 
unilateral emissions reductions while also moderating the trade impact on developing 
country partners. For example, the decline in output of energy-intensive manufacturing 
output in the US in the BTADR and BTAFR scenarios are respectively 2.6 and 0.5 
percent. The decline in China and India‘s manufacturing exports are between 1-3 percent 
in both scenarios. 
 
Despite these results, limiting the scope of trade actions to energy-intensive products 
would have problems that we discuss below.  
 
Robustness to different emissions reductions by high income countries 
 
Are our results contingent on the specific assumption we have made about emissions 
reductions by industrial countries? We replicate the analysis above for a range of 
assumptions about unilateral emissions reductions by high income countries, ranging 
from 5 percent to 40 percent, complemented with offsetting trade actions. The results are 
depicted in Figures 2 and 3.
18 Figure 2a captures the effects on global emissions. It shows 
that the magnitude of global emissions decline is related to the size of the cuts by 
industrial countries. Also, the largest emissions declines occur when border tax 
adjustments are taken on all products based on the carbon content in imports (BTAFU). 
But the difference in emissions reductions is not significant across scenarios. The reasons 
are suggested in Figure 2b, which depicts the possible leakage of emissions to developing 
countries. The greatest leakage occurs, unsurprisingly, in the case of unilateral emissions 
reductions without offsetting trade action. But even in this case, the leakage is small—a 
maximum of 2.5 percent increase in emissions when industrial countries reduce 
emissions by 40 percent. The reasons for this, as explained above are two-fold: emissions 
reductions by high income countries increase developing countries‘ exports of energy-
intensive goods, but exports are a small fraction of output, moderating the emissions 
impact. Moreover, in the long run and under full employment, any expansion of energy-
                                                                                                                                                 
but the emissions decline is greater in the BTADE scenario than in the BTADU scenario (10 percent versus 
9.3 percent). Thus, a pure consumption-based tax is overwhelmingly superior to a tax that distorts trade 
(BTADU) but not unambiguously superior to a pure production tax.  
18 For presentational clarity, we focus on the four main scenarios: NBTA17, BTADU, BTAFU, and 
BTADE.  14 
 
intensive sectors will lead to a contraction of other sectors, further moderating the 
emissions impact. 
 
Figure 2a: Impact of Unilateral Emissions Reductions by Industrial Countries on Global Emissions ( % change: relative 
to BAU in 2020) 
 
Figure 2b: Impact of Unilateral Emissions Reductions by Industrial Countries on Emissions of Low and Middle Income 
Countries( % change: relative to BAU in 2020) 
 
Figure 3a illustrates the competitiveness impact in industrial countries.  The larger the 
emissions reductions the greater the negative impact on competitiveness (all the curves – 
except in the scenario BTADE - are downward sloping and the scenario with no 
offsetting trade action is the most steep).  The milder form of trade action (BTADU) can 
claw back most of the competitiveness effects (the curve associated with this scenario are 
closer to the x-axis).  The extreme form of trade action (BTAFU) is even more successful 
in clawing back the competitiveness loss from unilateral emissions reduction.  But it is 
the efficient border tax adjustment (BTADE) that is successful in more-than-offsetting 





























































































































Figure 3a: Impact of Unilateral Emissions Reductions by Industrial Countries on their Output of Energy-Intensive 
Manufacturing ( % change: relative to 2005 for emissions reductions; and relative to BAU in 2020 for output) 
 
Figure 3b: Impact of Unilateral Emissions Reductions by Industrial Countries on China‘s Manufacturing Output (% 
change: relative to 2005 for emissions reductions; and relative to BAU in 2020 for output) 
 
                                                 
19 The BTADE results are sensitive to the manner in which subsidies are calculated. In the analysis 
presented in the text, subsides are linked to ex ante (base-year) levels of carbon content as is likely to be 
done in practice. But insofar as exporters reduce the carbon content of their production in response to 
higher energy prices, they are in effect over-compensated and the higher output is the consequence. We 
also re-did the scenarios with border taxes based on the ex post carbon content (results are available from 


































































































































Figure 3c: Impact of Unilateral Emissions Reductions by Industrial Countries on India‘s Manufacturing Ouptut (% 
change: relative to 2005 for emissions reductions; and relative to BAU in 2020 for output) 
 
 
The impact on China and India is shown in Figures 3b and 3c.  The impact on 
manufacturing output remains relatively muted when no trade policy actions are taken 
(NBTA17) or when the trade policy action is based on domestic carbon content (BTADU 
and BTADE).  But actions based on the carbon content of imports and applied to all 
merchandise imports lead to a dramatic decline in exports, with the magnitude depending 
on the extent of unilateral emissions reduction by industrial countries (BTAFU).    
 
VI. Implications for International Trade Rules 
 
From a purely trade perspective, the best outcome would be to have no scope for carbon-
based border tax adjustment.  However, as we have noted in the introduction, 
unconstrained border tax adjustments are already under consideration and enjoy a certain 
measure of support, including from the WTO.  It may, therefore, be useful to identify the 
least undesirable alternative which our results suggest is border tax adjustments based on 
the carbon content of domestic production and applied symmetrically to imports and 
exports.  
 
How would the different alternatives relate to existing trade rules?  Recall that current 
WTO rules and jurisprudence are not settled. If indirect taxes on inputs such as 
carbon/energy that are consumed in production can be subject to border tax adjustment, 
then it would seem that taxes based on both domestic and foreign carbon content would 
be permissible. If, on the other hand, taxes on consumed inputs cannot be subject to 
border tax adjustment, then it would seem that neither basis for border adjustments would 
be permissible. Of course, both bases for applying border taxes could be justified by the 
environmental exceptions provisions of Article XX (GATT, 1994), but that avenue itself 



































































What if WTO members, in order to resolve this uncertainty and to preclude unilateral 
action, incorporated a principle that allowed symmetric border tax adjustment based on 
carbon content in domestic production?  Presumably, they could invoke existing law 
which already allows such border tax adjustments in the export subsidy rules.  
 
This option would be different from the proposal made in Hufbauer et. al (2009) who 
suggest a hybrid of the origin and destination-based rule for border tax adjustments. In 
their scheme, a country would not rebate exporters the emissions taxes applied to 
domestic production, reflecting the origin principle. Hufbauer et. al (2009), however, 
would allow a country to apply  a border tax adjustment on imports if the domestic 
emissions tax in the importing country is greater than in the exporting country, reflecting 
the destination principle. As noted above, this amounts to double taxation of trade. They 
also do not specify whether the border tax adjustment on imports would be based on the 
carbon content of imports or domestic production. Thus, their proposal could correspond 
to our scenarios BTADU or BTAFU. And as we have shown, these scenarios are 
dominated by the symmetric border tax adjustment applied to imports and exports and 
based on the carbon content in domestic production (the BTADE scenario).  
 
It is important to note that the symmetric border tax adjustment option is vulnerable to 
the slippery slope argument. If the principle is accepted that border tax adjustments could 
be applied to non-embodied inputs consumed in the process of production, then this 
might open the door to similar adjustments for taxes on other inputs that are not 
embodied, and perhaps to other domestic taxes and regulations more broadly. This is 
another argument for not allowing the principle of carbon-based border tax adjustment in 
the first place. 
 
What about the alternative of limiting the scope for trade actions to energy-intensive 
imports, which our results suggest would be close to the symmetric border tax adjustment 
from a trade perspective? There are a number of problems with this approach, though. 
 
First, it would still leave room for border taxes based on the carbon content of imports.  
But taxes based on domestic carbon content are preferable to those based on the carbon 
content of imports. The former, by virtue of being uniform across sources of imports, will 
require less information (the carbon content in the domestic economy rather than that in 
all importing countries) and therefore be easier to implement and less open to abuse. 
Administrative efficiency and political economy would thus argue in favor of border 
taxes limited to those based on the carbon content of domestic production. But even taxes 
based on the carbon content in domestic production would not be easy to implement: a 
range of issues, including the level of industry disaggregation for calculating carbon 
content, would need to be addressed (see WTO, 2009).  
 
Second, even if trade actions were initially restricted to energy-intensive goods, they 
could provoke demands for extension: non-energy-intensive sectors would ask why they 
were being excluded from import relief, especially given, as our data shows, that there 
are large cross-country differences in total carbon intensity even in non-energy-intensive 
sectors (see Table 4). The risk that rules to restrict trade action to selected sectors could 18 
 
be vulnerable in this manner (i.e., open to future extension) is suggested by a recent EU 
Council decision on border tax adjustments.
20  
 
Third, a rule that would allow trade actions to be based on the carbon content of imports 
could not be symmetrically applied to exports.  Recall that border tax adjustments that 
preserve neutrality of incentives should strictly speaking apply to imports and exports. 
Such symmetric adjustments do not seem to be under consideration currently but they 
could be in future.  Symmetric border tax adjustment would have to be applied on the 
same basis and that basis would have to be the carbon content of domestic production. 
 
VII.  Conclusions 
 
Under the range of likely emissions reductions being envisaged by the major industrial 
countries, there will be clamor to offset the competitiveness pressure of imports from 
countries which make less ambitious reductions. For example, if industrial countries 
reduce emissions by 17 percent by 2020 relative to 2005 levels, energy-intensive 
industries in the US will face output declines of around 4 percent. There will also be 
demands from environmentalists for trade action on the grounds of emissions ―leakage‖ 
but our estimates show that these concerns are not warranted.  
 
Analytically, industrial countries can respond to competitiveness concerns by imposing 
tariffs or border tax adjustments.  The most extreme form of trade action would be one 
that is based on the carbon content of imports and applied to all merchandise imports. 
This would no doubt address the competitiveness and environmental concerns in high 
income countries but would come at the price of seriously damaging the trade prospects 
of developing country trading partners. Such an action would imply average tariffs on 
merchandise imports from India and China of over 20 percent and would depress 
manufacturing exports between 16 and 21 percent.  
 
A border tax adjustment that is applied to imports and exports and based on the carbon 
content in domestic production would broadly address the competitiveness concerns of 
producers in high income countries while inflicting less damage on developing country 
trade.  This option is, therefore, the least undesirable from a developing country trade 
perspective.  Therefore, as part of any international agreement on climate change, all 
countries could seek to negotiate rules in the WTO that would either prohibit all forms of 
carbon-based border tax adjustment, or at most allow under the strictest conditions the 
least undesirable option.   
  
We would stress the desirability of international agreement on trade actions being 
pursued as part of an international agreement on climate change rather than left to future 
negotiations in the WTO.  Otherwise developing countries will remain vulnerable to trade 
policy action, especially in its extreme version. Not only would such a state of affairs 
render uncertain the overall benefits for developing countries of international cooperation 
on climate change, it might actually vitiate the atmosphere and hence worsen the 
prospects for achieving such cooperation.       
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Table 1: Scenarios on Unilateral Emissions Reductions and Trade Actions (Border Tax Adjustments)
Scenario
Target Emissions Cuts
Basis for Border 
Tax Adjustment
Product Coverage 









High Income US EU High Income US EU High Income US EU
NBTA17 1.3 3.5 3.1 -6.4 -11.6 -5.2 -2.3 -4.4 -1.9
BTAFU -16.8 -10.1 -38.7 -15.7 -15.9 -21.5 -0.3 -2.5 1.8
BTADU -6.2 -4.6 -11.3 -8.8 -14.1 -7.8 -1.5 -3.6 -0.5
BTADE -3.2 -1.1 -7.8 1.4 0.7 4.1 0.0 -0.8 1.0
BTAFR -20.1 -12.4 -46.7 -4.3 -7.0 -3.2 2.2 -0.5 4.5
BTADR -7.5 -6.0 -14.9 -6.1 -10.6 -3.9 -0.8 -2.6 0.4
Table 2: Competitiveness Effects in Industrial Countries of Unilateral Emissions Reductions
% Change in Imports of Energy-
intensive Manufacturing
% Change in Exports of Energy-
intensive Manufacturing
% Change in Output of Energy-
intensive Manufacturing
Scenario
Notes: NBTA17:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and take no trade policy action;  BTAFU:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions 
by 17% and impose tariffs on all merchandise imports based on carbon content in imports;  BTADU:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and 
impose tariffs on all merchandise imports based on carbon content in domestic production;  BTADE:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% with 
import tariffs on all merchandise imports and rebates on all merchandise exports based on carbon content in domestic production;  BTAFR: Industrial 
countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and impose tariffs on energy-intensive merchandise imports based on carbon content in imports;  BTADR:Industrial 
countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and impose tariffs on energy-intensive merchandise imports based on carbon content in domestic production24 
 
 
Scenario World Total High Income US EU
Low and 
Middle 
Income China Brazil  India SSA
NBTA17 -9.3 -28.4 -33.5 -30.0 1.0 0.6 1.3 0.8 3.0
BTAFU -10.9 -28.5 -33.5 -30.0 -1.5 -1.7 0.6 -1.6 0.7
BTADU -9.8 -28.4 -33.5 -30.0 0.3 0.0 0.8 0.3 2.3
BTADE -10.0 -28.5 -33.5 -30.0 0.0 -0.3 0.8 -0.2 2.2
BTFAR -10.6 -28.5 -33.5 -30.0 -1.0 -1.3 0.6 -0.5 1.5
BTADR -9.8 -28.4 -33.5 -30.0 0.3 0.0 0.6 0.4 2.3
NBTA17 56.9 -11.4 -17.0 -17.0 122.5 183.5 37.6 156.5 82.5
BTAFU 54.1 -11.6 -17.0 -17.0 117.2 177.0 36.6 150.3 78.4
BTADU 56.2 -11.5 -17.0 -17.0 121.1 182.0 36.8 155.0 81.4
BTADE -17.0 -11.5 -17.0 -17.0 120.4 181.2 36.8 153.7 81.1
BTFAR 54.7 -11.5 -17.0 -17.0 118.2 178.3 36.5 153.2 79.9
BTADR 56.2 -11.5 -17.0 -17.0 121.1 181.9 36.6 155.3 81.3
% Change in Emissions Relative to Business as Usual (BAU) in 2020
% Change in Emissions Relative to 2005
Table 3: Impact on Emissions Reductions 
Notes: NBTA17:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and take no trade policy action;  BTAFU:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and 
impose tariffs on all merchandise imports based on carbon content in imports;  BTADU:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and impose tariffs on all 
merchandise imports based on carbon content in domestic production;  BTADE:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% with import tariffs on all 
merchandise imports and rebates on all merchandise exports based on carbon content in domestic production;  BTAFR: Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 
17% and impose tariffs on energy-intensive merchandise imports based on carbon content in imports;  BTADR:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and 



















































Agriculture 40 57 41 45 39 63 82 0 65 24 9 94 44 15 46 45 47 46
All energy 485 879 396 611 609 116 2067 1501 984 665 678 785 456 727 458 642 886 758
All manufacturing 18 36 21 38 36 53 127 111 158 91 127 243 152 65 47 25 107 46
Energy intensive manufacturing 43 90 53 92 98 141 326 283 313 288 735 538 384 159 126 62 279 116
Other manufacturing 7 12 6 8 8 8 35 36 31 34 20 74 50 17 13 8 31 14
Other industries 6 3 6 34 5 18 29 13 30 38 4 62 36 38 25 7 30 13
Service 21 32 16 38 39 63 82 68 171 135 89 213 107 67 73 26 97 36
Total 40 74 34 81 80 78 303 250 385 195 167 383 228 149 114 55 228 92
Agriculture 74 141 76 126 112 129 350 301 307 75 104 335 184 72 113 98 223 168
All energy 541 1016 433 735 636 186 2800 1749 1333 752 753 982 582 823 609 729 1147 928
All manufacturing 62 159 79 156 133 168 681 518 848 244 282 712 378 273 144 99 449 187
Energy intensive manufacturing 107 272 140 293 251 286 1163 888 1193 541 1062 1190 746 505 264 172 811 330
Other manufacturing 42 111 51 81 80 107 459 354 568 158 145 437 215 156 92 66 289 122
Other industries 46 69 46 114 77 89 561 287 381 232 218 401 179 240 110 60 342 132
Service 46 94 40 89 100 101 340 231 409 265 160 435 232 161 133 67 242 92
Total 74 153 70 157 155 149 772 535 767 332 281 672 380 281 199 109 479 187
Table 4.  Carbon Intensity by sector (in tons per million US dollars, 2004)
Direct Intensity



































Rest of High Income 5.1% 8.7% 3.2% 5.8% 3.3% 6.1% 4.0% 6.8% 1.1% 9.2% 0.7% 5.9%
Brazil 5.8% 9.9% 4.4% 7.1% 4.5% 7.4% 4.3% 6.7% 2.9% 10.4% 2.1% 7.2%
China 26.1% 42.7% 3.1% 6.2% 3.3% 6.5% 3.7% 6.8% 0.5% 44.6% 0.6% 6.3%
India 20.3% 28.5% 3.5% 6.8% 3.6% 7.0% 7.1% 9.8% 1.1% 29.8% 1.0% 6.9%
Russia 35.3% 40.0% 5.2% 6.5% 5.4% 6.7% 3.5% 5.1% 6.7% 42.0% 4.2% 6.6%
Rest of East Asia 9.5% 14.8% 3.1% 5.7% 3.2% 6.0% 3.8% 7.0% 1.1% 15.6% 0.7% 5.7%
Rest of South Asia 10.3% 39.2% 3.0% 5.7% 3.1% 5.9% 3.8% 6.4% 0.2% 41.0% 0.3% 5.8%
Rest of ECA 23.5% 39.7% 4.1% 6.7% 4.2% 6.9% 3.7% 5.5% 2.2% 42.3% 2.2% 6.8%
Middle East and North Africa 16.6% 30.4% 3.2% 6.3% 3.3% 6.5% 4.0% 6.3% 0.7% 32.0% 0.7% 6.4%
Sub-Saharan Africa 10.9% 19.0% 3.9% 6.6% 4.1% 6.8% 3.7% 6.4% 3.0% 20.1% 1.9% 6.7%
Rest of LAC 6.6% 11.8% 4.2% 7.6% 4.4% 8.0% 4.7% 7.7% 1.8% 12.3% 1.3% 7.8%
Notes: BTAFU:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and impose tariffs on all merchandise imports based on carbon content in imports;  BTADU:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and impose tariffs on all 
merchandise imports based on carbon content in domestic production;  BTADE:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% with import tariffs on all merchandise imports and rebates on all merchandise exports based on carbon 
content in domestic production; BTAFR: Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and impose tariffs on energy-intensive merchandise imports based on carbon content in imports;  BTADR:Industrial countries alone reduce 




BTADU BTAFU BTAFR BTADR
Table 5. Additional Tariff on Exports by Origin27 
 
 
Scenario World Total High Income US  EU
Low and 
Middle 
Income      China      India      Brazil SSA
NBTA17 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.7 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.5
BTAFU -1.0 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -2.4 -3.7 -1.4 -0.5 -1.2
BTADU -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.8 -0.6 -0.3 -0.4 -1.0
BTADE -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 -0.7
BTAFR -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.8 -0.7 -0.3 -0.3 -0.9
BTADR -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.7
NBTA17 -0.4 -0.8 -1.2 -0.8 0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.4 0.8
BTAFU -0.8 0.8 -0.2 1.9 -3.0 -3.6 -3.3 1.5 -0.9
BTADU -0.5 -0.6 -1.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 0.3 0.4
BTADE -0.4 -0.3 -0.5 0.0 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 0.0 -0.1
BTAFR -0.3 -0.4 -1.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.2 0.1
BTADR -0.4 -0.7 -1.2 -0.6 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.5
NBTA17 -1.0 -1.8 -2.3 -2.1 -0.1 -0.9 -0.3 1.0 2.7
BTAFU -12.9 -11.3 -10.1 -23.2 -14.8 -20.8 -16.0 1.9 -8.8
BTADU -4.0 -4.8 -6.5 -6.6 -3.2 -3.4 -3.2 -2.5 -1.8
BTADE -1.2 -0.5 0.0 0.5 -2.0 -1.8 -2.1 -0.6 -2.0
BTAFR -3.2 -3.5 -3.7 -5.8 -2.9 -3.2 -3.0 -1.8 -3.6
BTADR -1.9 -2.6 -3.4 -3.3 -1.2 -1.5 -1.3 -1.8 -0.1
% Change in Welfare
% Change in Output of Total Manufacturing
% Change in Exports of Total Manufacturing
Table 6: Impact on Welfare, Manufacturing Output, and Exports
Notes: NBTA17:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and take no trade policy action;  BTAFU:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions 
by 17% and impose tariffs on all merchandise imports based on carbon content in imports;  BTADU:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and 
impose tariffs on all merchandise imports based on carbon content in domestic production;  BTADE:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% with 
import tariffs on all merchandise imports and rebates on all merchandise exports based on carbon content in domestic production;  BTAFR: Industrial 
countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and impose tariffs on energy-intensive merchandise imports based on carbon content in imports;  BTADR:Industrial 
countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and impose tariffs on energy-intensive merchandise imports based on carbon content in domestic production28 
 
Technical Appendix: The Model and Numerical Analysis 
 
The results in this paper rely on the World Bank‘s Environmental Impact and 
Sustainability Applied General Equilibrium (ENVISAGE) Model.
21 The ENVISAGE 
model‘s core is a relatively standard recursive dynamic global general equilibrium (CGE) 
model. Incorporated with the core CGE model is a greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
module that is connected to a simple climate module that converts emissions into 
atmospheric concentrations, radiative forcing and changes in mean global temperature. 
The climate module has feedback on the economic model through so-called damage 
functions—currently limited to productivity shocks in agriculture. The combination of 
the socio-economic CGE model with the climate module is commonly referred to an 
integrated assessment model (IAM). 
 
ENVISAGE is calibrated to Release 7 of the GTAP dataset with a 2004 base year.
22 It 
has been used to simulate dynamic scenarios through 2100. For the purposes of this 
study, 2020 is the terminal year. The 113 countries/regions of GTAP are aggregated to 15 
countries/regions for this study and the 57 sectors are aggregated to 21 sectors. Full detail 
on the aggregation is provided in Appendix Table 1. The GTAP data is supplemented 
with satellite accounts that include emissions of the so-called Kyoto gases—carbon 
dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and hydrofluorocarbons (F-gases), 
different electricity production activities (coal, oil and gas, hydro, nuclear and other), and 
potential land and hydro supplies. 
 
Within each time period a full equilibrium is achieved given the fixed regional 
endowments, technology and consumer preferences. Production is modeled as a series of 
nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) functions that are designed to reflect the 
substitution and complementarity of inputs. Unlike many standard models, energy plays a 
key role as an input and is modeled as a complement to capital in the short-run but a 
substitute to capital in the long run. This reflects the putty/clay specification of 
production that incorporates vintage capital. The key assumption is that there is greater 
substitution across inputs in the long run (i.e. with new capital) than in the short run (with 
old or installed) capital. One consequence of this specification is that countries that have 
higher growth and higher rates of investment typically have a more flexible economy in 
the aggregate. Thus, all else equal, the same tax on carbon has a lower cost. There is a 
single representative household that consumes goods and services and saves.
23 The 
savings rate is partially a function of the demographic structure of the region. Savings 
rise as either the elderly or youth dependency ratios fall. The government sector is 
relatively passive. Aggregate expenditures are fixed as a share of total GDP and revenues 
adjust to maintain fiscal balance (through a lump sum tax on households). Investment is 
savings driven. 
 
                                                 
21 See van der Mensbrugghe 2008 for full details of the model. 
22 See www.gtap.org. 
23 The model is designed with several different consumer demand specifications including the CDE (see 
Hertel 1997), the LES/ELES (see van der Mensbrugghe 2006) and the AIDADS (see Rimmer and Powell 
1992 and van der Mensbrugghe 2006). For this paper we have used the AIDADS. 29 
 
Aggregate demand by sector is summed across all domestic agents and represents a 
composite of domestically produced goods and imports—the so-called Armington 
aggregate.
24 The aggregate Armington good is allocated between domestic production 
and imports using a two-nested CES specification. The first nest allocates aggregate 
demand between domestic production and an aggregate import bundle. The second nest 
decomposes aggregate imports into import by region of origin. This generates a bilateral 
trade flow matrix. Domestic producers are assumed to supply both domestic and export 
markets without friction, i.e. the law of one price holds for domestically produced goods 
irrespective of their final destination.
25 Bilateral trade is associated with three price 
wedges. The first wedge reflects differences between producer prices and the border 
(FOB) price, i.e. an export tax or subsidy. The second wedge reflects international trade 
and transport margins, i.e. the difference between FOB and CIF prices. The third wedge 
reflects the difference between the CIF price and the end-user price, i.e. import tariffs. All 
three wedges are fully bilateral. 
 
Model closure is consistent with long-term equilibrium. As stated above, fiscal balance is 
maintained through lump sum taxes on households under the assumption of fixed public 
expenditures (relative to GDP). Changes in revenues, for example carbon tax revenues, 
imply a net decrease in household direct taxes. Investment is savings driven. This 
assumption implies that changes in investment are likely to be relatively minor since 
public and foreign savings are fixed and household savings will be relatively stable 
relative to income. The third closure rule is that the capital account is balanced. Ex ante 
changes in the trade balance are therefore offset through real exchange rate effects. A 
positive rise in net transfers, for example through a cap and trade scheme, would tend to 
lead to a real exchange rate appreciation. 
 
The model dynamics are relatively straightforward. Population and labor force growth 
rates are based on the UN population‘s projection
26—with the growth in the labor force 
equated to the growth of the working age population. Investment, as mentioned above, is 
savings driven and the latter is partially influenced by demographics. Productivity growth 
in the baseline is ‗calibrated‘ to achieve a target growth path for per capita incomes—
differentiated for agriculture, manufacturing and services. 
 
Emissions of GHGs have three drivers. Most are generated through consumption of 
goods—either in intermediate of final demand—for example the combustion of fossil 
fuels. Some are driven by the level of factor input—for example methane produced by 
rice is linked to the amount of cultivated land. And the remainder is generated by 
aggregate output—for example waste-based methane emissions. The climate module 
takes as inputs emissions of GHGs and converts them to atmospheric concentration, then 
radiative forcing and finally temperature change.
27 
 
                                                 
24 Armington 1969. 
25 Analogously to aggregate domestic demand, the model allows for a two-nested constant-elasticity-of-
transformation function to allocate domestic production between domestic and foreign markets. 
26 United Nations 2007. 
27 The climate module is largely derived from the MERGE model, Manne et al 1995. 30 
 
The temperature change is linked back to the socio-economic model through damage 
functions. The damage functions—currently limited to agriculture—are calibrated to 
estimates provided by Cline (2007). His estimates relate to anticipated productivity 
impacts from a 2.5° C in temperature
28, estimated to occur according to his estimates in 
2080. Cline provides two sets of estimates. One set allows for the positive impact of 
higher concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere on plant growth—a so-called carbon 
fertilization effect. The other excludes this effect. The scientific community is still 
uncertain about this effect. Greenhouse gas experiments suggest it may be potent. Field 
experiments suggest otherwise. In our simulations, we use the average of the two 
estimates. 
 
ENVISAGE has a flexible system of mitigation policies (limited to the moment to CO2 
emissions alone). The simplest is a country or region specific carbon tax—that also 
allows for exemptions for designated sectors or households. An alternative is to provide a 
cap on emissions at either a country, regional or global level. The model will then 
produce the shadow price of carbon, i.e. the carbon tax, as a model outcome. If a global 
cap is imposed, a single uniform tax will be calculated. This type of regime assumes no 
trading. A final option is to have a regional or global cap with trading and assigned 
quotas. Similar to the previous regime, a uniform carbon tax will be calculated (and 
would be nearly identical to the no-trade carbon tax), but emissions trading would occur 
depending on the initial quotas and the shape of the individual marginal abatement curves 
for each member of the trading regime. 
 
One intuitive way to capture the inter-country differences of a carbon tax is the following 
formula that is derived from a simple partial equilibrium framework:
29 
 
(1)   
 
In formula (1),   is the carbon tax, P is the price of energy (for example $ per ton of oil 
equivalent),   is the average carbon content of energy (for example ton of carbon per ton 
of oil equivalent),   is the overall elasticity of substitution across factors include energy 
and R is the level of emissions reduction.
30 The left hand side of the formula shows the 
level of reduction for a given carbon tax and the right hand side shows the level of the 
carbon tax for a given reduction level. With R equal to 0, the carbon tax is obviously 0. 
The formula suggests that the carbon tax is higher (for a given targeted reduction) with 
higher energy prices, lower carbon content (i.e. cleaner economies) and less flexible 
economies (i.e. with a low value for  ). This suggests that the carbon tax will be higher 
on average in developed economies that already have high energy prices and relatively 
clean energy (for example France and Japan) and have lower savings and therefore more 
installed and less flexible capital than on average in the rapidly developing economies. 
                                                 
28 Which he assumes occurs in the 2080s based on the SRES scenarios (IPCC 2000) and global climate 
change model (GCM) runs. 
29 See Burniaux et al. 1992. 
30 For example, if energy is priced at $50 per ton of oil equivalent and the average carbon content is 50% 
and the substitution elasticity is 0.8 and a carbon tax of $150 per ton of carbon is imposed, the level of 
reduction would be 52 percent. 31 
 
The implication of this is that on aggregate developed countries will wish to purchase 
carbon offsets from developing countries in a cap and trade regime where quotas for 
developed countries are below baseline emissions. 
 
Unilateral action and leakage 
One key concern in any carbon regime that excludes major carbon emitters is that 
production of carbon intense goods will move to countries with no (or a lower) price on 
carbon. Burniaux and Oliveira Martins (2000) provide a succinct discussion of the main 
channels of leakage—distinguishing between non-energy and energy markets. On the 
non-energy side, one of the key channels of course is that the higher cost of production in 
countries with a carbon tax will lead to a competitive disadvantage and shift production 
to lower cost countries. The degree of leakage will therefore depend on the tradability of 
non-energy goods (reflected by the so-called Armington elasticity in most trade models) 
and on capital mobility. Leakage would increase with tradability as the rise in domestic 
costs would lead to large substitution effects with rising imports and declining exports. 
The role of capital mobility is less clear cut and could potentially go in reverse direction 
(though is closely linked to the Armington elasticity). A drop in international energy 
prices (particularly oil), could potentially lead to a real exchange rate appreciation for 
Annex I countries and a capital inflow. 
 
As regards the energy market, the degree of leakage will depend on two effects—how 
much energy prices drop in non-Annex I countries thus leading to increased energy 
demand and emissions and the degree of inter-fuel substitution. The energy channels are 
essentially of three kinds. First there is role of ‗carbon‘ supply elasticities. As the price of 
oil drops internationally, there would be a relative switch to oil away from coal in non-
Annex I countries. All else equal, this would tend to reduce leakage as coal is more 
intensive in carbon. The lower the supply elasticity of oil, the greater the price drop of 
oil, and the higher the supply elasticity of coal, the more its price is invariant to demand 
changes and the combination of these two effects would minimize leakage. This would be 
moderated to some extent by the degree of tradability of coal. A low supply elasticity of 
coal linked with a highly integrated coal market would induce Annex I coal producers to 
export considerable volumes to non-Annex I countries. For a variety of reasons, including 
logistical, this is an unlikely outcome. Another channel is inter-fuel substitutability. Here 





It is difficult to undertake systematic sensitivity analysis with a full-blown CGE model. 
An alternative approach is to reduce the model to some core set of relations that capture 
the essence of the full model and that is amenable to systematic sensitivity analysis. This 
is the approach taken by Burniaux and Oliviera Martins, which we have attempted to 
replicate though with some modifications. We have re-constructed their model, but have 
converted it to a model in levels rather than linearized in percent deviation. Second, we 
have calibrated the model to the same database as the ENVISAGE model with a 2004 
base instead of the 1985 database. Third, rather than replicate their pair-wise sensitivity 32 
 
analysis, that clearly illustrates the impacts of the various channels, we take a 
probabilistic approach that assumes some probability distribution for each of the 
uncertain key parameters. 
 
The stochastic approach we take is the same as used by Hope (2006) with the PAGE2002 
model and that underscored many of the numerical results in the Stern Review (2007). 
The approach uses a technique called Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS).
31 It is a 
restricted form of Monte Carlo simulation where the multivariate sampling is done from a 
limited number of observations but whose statistical properties match closely those that 
would be generated from full Monte Carlo sampling. The resulting sample (of 10,000 in 
our case) of the key parameter values are used in the reduced form model and generate a 
distribution of the leakage rates. Table 1c shows the list of the key parameters in the 
reduced form model
32 with the mode value. The mode variable corresponds roughly with 
the parameter values in the full ENVISAGE Model. Each parameter is assigned a 
triangular distribution that covers the assumed range of the parameter. 
 
Appendix Figure 1 depicts the frequency distribution generated by the sampling exercise. 
The policy shock is a 28 percent reduction in Annex I emissions (corresponding to the 17 
percent reduction target relative to 2005 that translates into a 28 percent reduction 
relative to 2020 baseline values). The mean leakage rate using the reduced form model is 
11 percent with a standard deviation of 5 percent. A little over 1 percent of the sample 
exhibited a leakage rate of below zero and 94 percent of the sample fell between a 
leakage rate of 0 and 20 percent.  
 
The leakage rate generated by ENVISAGE is considerably lower than the mean of 11 
percent. There are a number of potential causes that need further exploration. First, the 
production structure in ENVISAGE is different from that in the maquette as we tailored it 
more to the Burniaux and Oliveira Martins model and not to ENVISAGE. Second, the 
data calibration could be impacting some of the key relations—across fuels and with the 
emission coefficients. Third, there might be strong compositional effects—both across 
regions and across sectors that would affect the overall impact on the leakage rate. 
In the literature there a not a plethora of leakage estimates—and they are hard to compare 
in any case: a) because the nature of the shock is different (e.g. many of the earlier 
estimates focused on the potential leakage effects from the Kyoto Protocol) b) different 
model base years and baselines; and c) different model specifications and key elasticities. 
Burniaux and Oliveira Martins cite a range of leakage rates with respect to the Kyoto 
Protocol of between 2 and 21 percent. Fischer and Fox (2009) provide some leakage rates 
at the sectoral level that range from 8 percent to 64 percent from a simulation of the 
imposition of a carbon tax of $50/tC. Again the comparison with the results discussed 
herein is difficult as the nature of the model and the shock is quite different. The paper is 
also silent on the relative fossil fuel supply elasticities that appear to be so crucial. 
Babiker (2005) focuses on the leakage effects from the Kyoto Protocol. The leakage 
effects range from around 25 to over 100 percent, albeit the model assumes a low coal 
supply elasticity (0.5). The paper is interesting because it shows the sensitivity of the 
                                                 
31 See McKay et al. (1979) and Swiler and Wyss (2004). 
32 Details of the reduced-form model are available from the authors. 33 
 
leakage rate to two key assumptions—the tradability of goods (comparing an Armington 
model with a Hecksher-Ohlin specification) and constant versus increasing rates of 
return. Burniaux and Oliveira Martins suggest that the tradability parameter has relatively 
little impact on the leakage rate and given the high Armington elasticities we are using, 
one wouldn‘t expect a large effect from moving to a Hecksher-Ohlin specification.  
However, Babiker demonstrates that this no longer holds true with increasing returns to 
scale. Given the wide range of uncertainty, it would appear that this issue would benefit 
from a more detailed study comparing leakage rates across models with some initial 
harmonization on key assumptions and then exploring alternatives. 
 
Appendix Figure 1 
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Appendix Table 1a: Regional dimensions of ENVISAGE
a 
1  eur  EU27 with EFTA 
   
Austria (aut), Belgium (bel), Cyprus (cyp), Czech Republic (cze), Denmark (dnk), Estonia (est), Finland (fin), 
France (fra), Germany (deu), Greece (grc), Hungary (hun), Ireland (irl), Italy (ita), Latvia (lva), Lithuania (ltu), 
Luxembourg (lux), Malta (mlt), Netherlands (nld), Poland (pol), Portugal (prt), Slovakia (svk), Slovenia (svn), 
Spain (esp), Sweden (swe), United Kingdom (gbr), Switzerland (che), Norway (nor), Rest of EFTA (xef), 
Bulgaria (bgr), Romania (rou) 
2  usa  United States 
3  jpn  Japan 
4  kor  Korea 
5  rha  Rest of high income Annex 1 
   
Australia (aus), New Zealand (nzl), Canada (can) 
6  rhy  Rest of high income 
   
Hong Kong (hkg), Taiwan (twn), Singapore (sgp) 
6  bra  Brazil 
7  chn  China 
8  ind  India 
9  rus  Russia 
10  xea  Rest of East Asia 
   
Rest of Oceania (xoc), Rest of East Asia (xea), Cambodia (khm), Laos (lao), Myanmar (mmr), Viet Nam (vnm), 
Indonesia (idn), Malaysia (mys), Philippines (phl), Thailand (tha),  Bangladesh (bgd), Pakistan (pak) 
11  xsa  Rest of South Asia 
   
Rest of Southeast Asia (xse), Sri Lanka (lka), Rest of South Asia (xsa) 
12  xec  Rest of Europe and Central Asia 
   
Albania (alb), Belarus (blr), Croatia (hrv), Ukraine (ukr), Rest of Eastern Europe (xee), Rest of Europe (xer), 
Kazakhstan (kaz), Kyrgystan (kgz), Rest of Former Soviet Union (xsu), Armenia (arm), Azerbaijan (aze), 
Georgia (geo) 
13  mna  Middle East and North Africa 
   
Iran (irn), Turkey (tur), Rest of Western Asia (xws), Egypt (egy), Morocco (mar), Tunisia (tun), Rest of North 
Africa (xnf) 
14  ssa  Sub-Saharan Africa 
   
Nigeria (nga), Senegal (sen), Rest of Western Africa (xwf), Central Africa (xcf), South-Central Africa (xac), 
Ethiopia (eth), Madagascar (mdg), Malawi (mwi), Mauritius (mus), Mozambique (moz), Tanzania (tza), Uganda 
(uga), Zambia (zmb), Zimbabwe (zwe), Rest of Eastern Africa (xec), Botswana (bwa), South Africa (zaf), Rest 
of South African Customs Union (xsc) 
15  xlc  Rest of Latin America and the Caribbean 
   
Mexico (mex), Rest of North America (xna), Argentina (arg), Bolivia (bol), Chile (chl), Colombia (col), Ecuador 
(ecu), Paraguay (pry), Peru (per), Uruguay (ury), Venezuela (ven), Rest of South America (xsm), Costa Rica 
(cri), Guatemala (gtm), Nicaragua (nic), Panama (pan), Rest of Central America (xca), Caribbean (xcb) 
Note(s):  a) Aggregate regions indicate relevant GTAP countries/regions with GTAP code in parenthesis. 
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Appendix Table 1b: Sectoral dimensions of ENVISAGE
a 
1  cop  Crops 
   
Paddy rice (pdr), Wheat (wht), Cereal grains, n.e.s. (gro), Vegetables and fruits (v_f), Oil seeds (osd), Sugar cane 
and sugar beet (c_b), Plant-based fibers (pfb), Crops, n.e.s. (ocr) 
2  lvs  Livestock 
   
Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses (ctl), Animal products n.e.s. (oap), Raw milk (rmk), Wool, silk-worm 
cocoons (wol) 
3  frs  Forestry 
4  coa  Coal 
5  oil  Crude oil 
6  gas  Natural gas 
7  omn  Other mining 
8  pfd  Processed food 
   
Fishing (fsh), Bovine cattle, sheep and goat, horse meat products (cmt), Meat products n.e.s. (omt), Vegetable oils 
and fats (vol), Dairy products (mil), Processed rice (pcr), Sugar (sgr), Food products n.e.s. (ofd), Beverages and 
tobacco products (b_t) 
9  p_c  Refined oil 
10  crp  Chemicals rubber and plastics 
11  ppp  Paper products, publishing 
12  nmm  Mineral products n.e.s. 
13  i_s  Ferrous metals 
14  nfm  Metals n.e.s. 
15  tre  Transport equipment 
    Motor vehicles and parts (mvh), Transport equipment n.e.s. (otn) 
16  mnu  Other manufacturing 
   
Textiles (tex), Wearing apparel (wap), Leather products (lea), Wood products (lum), Metal products (fmp), 
Electronic equipment (ele), Machinery and equipment n.e.s. (ome), Manufactures n.e.s. (omf) 
17  ely  Electricity
b 
18  gdt  Gas distribution 
19  cns  Construction 
20  trp  Transport services 
    Transport n.e.s. (otp), Sea transport (wtp), Air transport (atp) 
21  osv  Other services 
   
Water (wtr), Trade (trd), Communication (cmn), Financial services n.e.s. (ofi), Insurance (isr), Business services 
n.e.s. (obs), Recreation and other services (ros), Public administration and defence, education, health services 
(osg), Dwellings (dwe) 
Note(s):  a) Aggregate sectors indicate relevant GTAP sectors with GTAP code in parenthesis. 
 
b) Electricity is a single consumed and traded commodity. However, in each region/country it is 
produced by multiple activities that include coal and gas power plants, hydro-electricity, nuclear and 
other (mainly renewable) technologies. 
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Appendix Table 1c: Key elasticities with reference bounds 
 
 
   
 
  Annex I  Non-Annex I 
 
  Minimum  Mode  Maximum  Minimum  Mode  Maximum 
Production substitution elasticities 
p  Energy-value added  0.2  0.4  1.2  0.2  0.4  1.2 
e  Inter-fuel  0.5  0.6  3.0  0.5  0.8  3.0 
v  Capital-labor  0.3  0.8  1.2  0.6  1.0  1.2 
 
 
           
Energy supply elasticities 
coal  Coal  0.0  5.0  20.0  0.0  5.0  20.0 
oil  Oil  0.0  1.5  3.0  0.0  1.5  3.0 
Other-energy  Lower carbon energy  0.0  1.5  3.0  0.0  1.5  3.0 
               
Armington trade elasticities 
Non-energy  Non-energy good  1.5  4.0  8.0  1.5  4.0  8.0 
coal  Coal  2.0  5.0  10.0  2.0  5.0  10.0 
Other-energy  Lower carbon energy  1.5  4.0  8.0  1.5  4.0  8.0 
 
 
           
International mobility of capital 
k  Transformation elasticity  0.0  1.0  20.0 

















































NBTA17 -30.0 -33.5 -15.8 -34.4 1.7 1.3 0.6 0.8 0.6 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.7 3.0 1.6 -28.4 1.0 -9.3
BTAFU -30.0 -33.5 -15.8 -34.4 0.9 0.6 -1.3 -0.5 -0.9 0.1 -1.3 -2.2 -2.0 1.5 0.6 -28.5 -1.0 -10.6
BTADU -30.0 -33.5 -15.8 -34.4 0.6 0.8 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.9 -0.2 -0.4 0.0 2.2 0.8 -28.5 0.0 -10.0
BTADE -30.0 -33.5 -15.8 -34.4 0.6 0.8 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.9 -0.2 -0.4 0.0 2.2 0.8 -28.5 0.0 -10.0
BTAFR -30.0 -33.5 -15.8 -34.4 1.1 0.6 0.0 0.4 0.1 1.0 0.4 0.1 0.5 2.3 1.0 -28.4 0.3 -9.8
BTADR -30.0 -33.5 -15.8 -34.4 0.2 0.6 -1.7 -1.6 -1.4 0.0 -1.6 -2.1 -2.4 0.7 -0.3 -28.5 -1.5 -10.9
NBTA17 -17.0 -17.0 -17.0 -17.0 74.2 37.6 183.5 156.5 125.3 74.4 121.7 124.6 35.3 82.5 73.3 -11.4 122.5 56.9
BTAFU -17.0 -17.0 -17.0 -17.0 71.7 36.6 177.0 150.3 120.8 71.6 115.7 117.4 29.8 78.4 70.1 -11.6 117.2 54.1
BTADU -17.0 -17.0 -17.0 -17.0 74.2 37.6 183.5 156.5 125.3 74.4 121.7 124.6 35.3 82.5 73.3 -11.4 122.5 56.9
BTADE -17.0 -17.0 -17.0 -17.0 73.1 36.8 182.0 155.0 124.3 73.4 120.5 122.5 33.8 81.4 71.7 -11.5 121.1 56.2
BTAFR -17.0 -17.0 -17.0 -17.0 72.8 36.5 178.3 153.2 121.9 71.8 116.4 117.1 30.4 79.9 71.5 -11.5 118.2 54.7
BTADR -17.0 -17.0 -17.0 -17.0 72.4 36.8 181.2 153.7 123.7 73.1 118.8 121.1 33.0 81.1 72.0 -11.5 120.4 55.8
Relative to 2005
Appendix Table 2. Emissions Reductions (percent)
Relative to Business as Usual (BAU) in 2020
Notes: NBTA17:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and take no trade policy action;  BTAFU:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and impose tariffs on all merchandise imports based on carbon 
content in imports; BTADU:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and impose tariffs on all merchandise imports based on carbon content in domestic production;  BTADE:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions 
by 17% with import tariffs on all merchandise imports and rebates on all merchandise exports based on carbon content in domestic production;  BTAFR: Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and impose tariffs on 












































NBTA17 332.8 248.7 246.6 218.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 241.1 n.a. 66.6
BTAFU 318.1 245.0 238.9 215.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 234.8 n.a. 66.0
BTADU 330.0 247.2 247.7 218.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 239.9 n.a. 66.6
BTADE 339.7 257.1 256.9 237.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 249.3 n.a. 69.3
BTAFR 345.4 252.7 257.0 225.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 248.1 n.a. 69.5
BTADR 337.4 250.8 249.7 221.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 244.0 n.a. 67.7
Appendix Table 3. Emissions Tax in dollars per ton carbon 
Notes: NBTA17:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and take no trade policy action;  BTAFU:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and impose tariffs on all merchandise imports based on carbon 
content in imports; BTADU:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and impose tariffs on all merchandise imports based on carbon content in domestic production;  BTADE:Industrial countries alone reduce 
emissions by 17% with import tariffs on all merchandise imports and rebates on all merchandise exports based on carbon content in domestic production;  BTAFR: Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and impose 
tariffs on energy-intensive merchandise imports based on carbon content in imports;  BTADR:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and impose tariffs on energy-intensive merchandise imports based on carbon 
content in domestic production39 
 
 
NBTA17 BTAFU BTADU BTADE BTAFR BTADR
EU27 with EFTA -0.7 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6
United States -0.6 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6
Japan -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Rest of high income Annex 1 -0.9 -1.0 -0.8 -1.1 -0.9 -0.9
Rest of high income -0.1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2
Brazil -0.1 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2
China -0.2 -3.7 -0.6 -0.3 -0.7 -0.3
India 0.0 -1.4 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 -0.1
Russia -1.1 -3.6 -1.7 -1.7 -1.8 -1.4
Rest of East Asia -0.4 -1.3 -0.9 -0.6 -0.8 -0.6
Rest of South Asia -0.3 -0.6 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3
Rest of ECA -0.3 -2.3 -0.9 -0.8 -1.5 -0.7
Middle East and North Africa -0.1 -2.4 -0.7 0.0 -0.6 -0.3
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.5 -1.2 -1.0 -0.7 -0.9 -0.7
Rest of LAC -0.7 -1.8 -1.4 -0.8 -1.1 -0.9
High income countries -0.6 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
Low and middle income countries -0.3 -2.4 -0.8 -0.5 -0.8 -0.5
World total -0.5 -1.0 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.5
Scenarios         
Countries/Regions
Unilateral Reductions
Appendix Table 4. Change in Welfare by region (percent)
Notes: NBTA17:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and take no trade policy action; 
BTAFU:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and impose tariffs on all merchandise imports 
based on carbon content in imports; BTADU:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and 
impose tariffs on all merchandise imports based on carbon content in domestic production; 
BTADE:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% with import tariffs on all merchandise imports 
and rebates on all merchandise exports based on carbon content in domestic production;  BTAFR: 
Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and impose tariffs on energy-intensive merchandise 
imports based on carbon content in imports; BTADR:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% 













































Agriculture -0.6 -1.0 -0.1 1.0 0.1 -1.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.5 0.0 -0.2
All energy -7.8 -14.8 -3.0 -9.2 2.6 1.0 0.6 0.7 -0.2 0.2 0.2 0.7 1.5 -1.1 -2.2 -9.3 0.0 -4.2
All manufacturing -0.8 -1.2 -0.8 -0.9 -0.1 0.4 -0.2 0.1 2.0 0.1 -0.1 0.3 -0.3 0.8 1.1 -0.8 0.1 -0.4
Energy intensive manufacturing -1.9 -4.4 -1.8 -5.9 2.5 2.1 1.2 1.8 5.2 3.0 2.2 3.9 3.2 3.2 3.2 -2.3 2.1 -0.5
Other manufacturing -0.3 0.4 -0.3 2.4 -1.2 -0.4 -0.9 -0.7 0.2 -0.9 -0.7 -1.8 -1.5 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.8 -0.4
Other industries -0.3 -1.3 -0.3 -2.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.7 -0.1 -0.4
Service -0.5 -0.3 0.0 -0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.2
Total -0.8 -1.2 -0.3 -1.4 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.8 0.0 -0.5
Agriculture -3.2 -8.9 -0.4 -10.2 1.2 -4.0 4.0 0.3 2.7 1.1 0.2 2.2 2.2 1.4 0.7 -5.5 1.6 -1.4
All energy -8.2 -15.0 -1.6 -9.8 0.7 0.5 -0.7 -0.5 -1.7 -0.5 -1.0 -0.9 0.3 -0.3 -8.2 -9.6 -1.9 -5.4
All manufacturing 1.9 -0.2 -0.5 3.1 -0.8 1.5 -3.6 -3.3 0.6 -1.9 -3.0 -4.8 -8.8 -0.9 1.9 0.8 -3.0 -0.8
Energy intensive manufacturing 1.8 -2.5 -1.5 -1.0 -2.2 1.5 -0.8 -1.6 -2.6 -2.3 -3.5 -7.2 -5.6 -1.9 1.4 -0.3 -1.4 -0.7
Other manufacturing 1.9 0.8 0.0 5.9 -0.2 1.4 -5.0 -4.2 2.5 -1.7 -2.9 -3.5 -9.8 -0.4 2.1 1.3 -3.8 -0.8
Other industries -0.5 -1.5 -0.6 -2.9 -0.4 -0.9 -3.1 -1.2 -3.0 -1.6 -0.2 -3.2 -2.4 -3.1 -1.8 -1.0 -2.5 -1.6
Service -1.1 -0.4 -0.1 -1.0 0.3 0.1 -0.4 0.4 -0.9 1.3 0.9 1.7 2.5 0.3 -0.1 -0.6 0.4 -0.4
Total -0.3 -1.2 -0.3 -1.1 -0.2 0.1 -2.2 -1.3 -0.8 -0.6 -0.7 -1.1 -2.5 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -1.5 -0.9
Agriculture -0.9 -2.9 0.0 -2.0 0.8 -0.8 0.8 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 1.1 -1.6 0.4 -0.4
All energy -7.4 -14.7 -2.6 -8.9 2.0 0.0 0.2 0.6 -0.7 0.2 0.0 -0.2 1.1 -1.2 -4.3 -9.1 -0.7 -4.5
All manufacturing -0.3 -1.2 -0.7 0.0 -0.8 0.3 -0.5 -0.4 2.0 -0.6 -1.0 -0.6 -1.9 0.4 0.7 -0.6 -0.4 -0.5
Energy intensive manufacturing -0.5 -3.6 -1.6 -3.9 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.7 3.1 1.1 1.3 0.4 0.4 1.5 1.8 -1.5 0.7 -0.6
Other manufacturing -0.2 0.0 -0.3 2.7 -1.5 0.2 -0.9 -0.9 1.4 -1.2 -1.6 -1.1 -2.7 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.9 -0.5
Other industries -0.2 -1.3 -0.2 -2.5 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.2 -1.1 -0.8 -0.4 -0.9 -0.8 -0.9 -1.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.7
Service -0.6 -0.3 0.0 -0.7 0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.5 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.1 -0.4 0.1 -0.3
Total -0.7 -1.2 -0.3 -1.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.1 -0.3 -0.8 -0.2 -0.6
Agriculture -0.4 -1.0 0.4 -0.7 -0.2 -0.8 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.5 0.0 0.2 -0.6 0.0 -0.2
All energy -6.1 -12.6 -2.3 -6.4 0.0 -1.0 -0.6 -0.5 -1.2 -0.9 -1.2 -1.7 -1.1 -2.1 -4.1 -7.8 -1.5 -4.3
All manufacturing 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 1.0 -1.9 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 1.0 -0.8 -1.1 -1.6 -2.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.3 -0.6 -0.4
Energy intensive manufacturing 1.0 -0.8 -0.6 3.8 -3.2 -1.2 -1.1 -1.7 0.4 -2.6 -1.9 -3.7 -4.2 -1.3 -1.4 0.0 -1.6 -0.6
Other manufacturing -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.8 -1.3 0.6 -0.2 0.0 1.3 -0.2 -0.9 -0.3 -1.5 0.4 1.0 -0.5 -0.1 -0.4
Other industries -0.2 -1.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -1.1 -0.8 -0.3 -0.9 -0.6 -0.4 -0.7 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
Service -0.7 -0.5 0.0 -1.3 1.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 -0.4 1.1 0.6 1.0 1.3 0.5 0.6 -0.5 0.5 -0.2
Total -0.6 -1.0 -0.2 -0.9 -0.4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.4 0.0 -0.2 -0.7 -0.2 -0.6
Agriculture -1.5 -2.3 -0.3 -1.7 0.5 -0.5 0.9 0.1 1.4 0.4 0.1 1.0 0.7 0.8 1.1 -1.6 0.6 -0.3
All energy -7.7 -14.9 -2.4 -9.6 1.4 0.0 -0.9 -0.1 -0.3 -0.7 -1.3 -1.1 -1.0 -1.3 -2.8 -9.4 -1.0 -4.8
All manufacturing -0.1 -1.0 -0.7 0.3 -0.1 0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -1.7 -1.2 0.1 0.9 -0.4 -0.2 -0.3
Energy intensive manufacturing 4.5 -0.5 1.2 1.6 -0.2 -0.4 -3.9 -2.2 -6.2 -3.5 -3.4 -11.2 -7.4 -2.5 -0.5 2.2 -3.7 -0.3
Other manufacturing -2.4 -1.3 -1.6 -0.5 -0.1 0.5 1.6 0.6 3.2 1.1 0.7 3.7 0.9 1.4 1.6 -1.7 1.4 -0.4
Other industries -0.3 -1.2 -0.3 -2.4 -0.1 -0.3 -0.7 -0.2 -1.5 -0.8 -0.4 -2.1 -0.5 0.0 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.7
Service -0.6 -0.3 0.0 -0.7 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.5 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -0.3
Total -0.7 -1.2 -0.3 -1.3 0.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.4 0.0 -0.1 -0.7 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.8 -0.2 -0.6
Agriculture -1.0 -1.6 -0.2 -0.2 0.4 -0.4 0.4 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.8 -1.0 0.3 -0.3
All energy -7.8 -14.8 -2.8 -9.4 1.8 0.4 0.1 0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 0.1 0.6 -1.2 -2.2 -9.4 -0.3 -4.4
All manufacturing -0.6 -1.2 -0.8 -0.5 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.4 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.6 0.5 0.8 -0.7 0.0 -0.4
Energy intensive manufacturing 0.4 -2.6 -1.1 -2.4 0.3 -0.3 -0.4 0.3 1.7 -0.1 0.4 -1.0 -0.6 0.6 0.3 -0.8 -0.1 -0.5
Other manufacturing -1.0 -0.5 -0.6 0.8 -0.4 0.3 -0.1 -0.2 1.3 0.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.6 0.5 1.1 -0.7 0.1 -0.4
Other industries -0.3 -1.2 -0.2 -2.5 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.8 -0.5 -0.3 -0.7 -0.2 -0.1 -0.6 -0.7 -0.3 -0.5
Service -0.5 -0.3 0.0 -0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.2
Total -0.8 -1.2 -0.3 -1.3 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.8 0.0 -0.6







Notes: NBTA17:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and take no trade policy action;  BTAFU:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and impose tariffs on all merchandise imports based on 
carbon content in imports; BTADU:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and impose tariffs on all merchandise imports based on carbon content in domestic production;  BTADE:Industrial countries alone 
reduce emissions by 17% with import tariffs on all merchandise imports and rebates on all merchandise exports based on carbon content in domestic production;  BTAFR: Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 
17% and impose tariffs on energy-intensive merchandise imports based on carbon content in imports;  BTADR:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and impose tariffs on energy-intensive merchandise 








































Agriculture -4.0 -1.7 -2.5 1.0 -1.9 -3.1 -1.3 -0.3 3.4 -2.1 -0.9 -0.8 -2.0 0.2 -0.8 -1.5 -1.9 -1.6
All energy -8.3 -19.0 -2.9 -5.9 9.1 -1.9 -0.2 6.3 -6.0 -3.2 -3.2 -2.8 -9.5 -3.1 -8.2 -9.4 -5.1 -6.1
All manufacturing -2.1 -2.3 -2.0 -2.0 -0.6 1.0 -0.9 -0.3 7.1 -0.3 -0.9 0.4 -0.9 2.7 3.2 -1.8 -0.1 -1.0
Energy intensive manufacturing -5.2 -11.6 -6.5 -11.5 3.7 7.6 6.7 6.4 11.5 5.0 6.5 5.5 5.6 8.3 11.5 -6.4 7.0 -0.7
Other manufacturing -0.6 1.6 -0.8 4.7 -1.7 -2.0 -2.3 -2.7 1.1 -1.6 -2.0 -3.4 -2.8 -1.4 -0.1 0.0 -2.1 -1.0
Other industries -0.8 -0.2 -0.8 -10.4 -2.3 1.6 0.3 1.5 1.7 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.8 1.9 4.4 -3.5 1.5 -0.5
Service -1.5 -1.8 0.6 0.3 0.0 1.6 1.5 -1.4 7.6 3.4 2.5 2.3 0.8 2.2 6.8 -1.1 1.8 0.0
Total -2.2 -2.7 -1.8 -2.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.7 -0.2 -0.8 -0.3 -0.6 0.0 -0.5 0.0 -0.6 -2.0 -0.5 -1.3
Agriculture -31.6 -18.6 -21.8 -17.4 -10.9 -10.8 31.0 25.7 20.7 -4.5 -2.7 11.2 6.3 3.0 -5.7 -20.2 -3.8 -16.3
All energy -35.0 -33.0 -27.5 -11.1 6.3 -4.1 -1.0 13.8 -7.2 -2.9 -2.8 -2.8 -0.7 -2.1 -18.0 -23.9 -8.2 -11.9
All manufacturing -23.2 -10.1 -13.2 2.8 -1.7 1.9 -20.8 -16.0 -14.3 -4.8 -9.3 -13.7 -20.2 -8.8 2.1 -11.3 -14.8 -12.9
Energy intensive manufacturing -21.5 -15.9 -20.9 -6.9 -7.6 -2.2 -16.6 -9.7 -19.7 -8.4 -22.3 -15.5 -15.3 -12.3 -4.5 -15.7 -13.0 -14.6
Other manufacturing -24.0 -7.8 -11.1 9.5 -0.1 3.7 -21.6 -18.3 -6.9 -4.0 -7.4 -12.3 -21.6 -6.2 4.8 -9.5 -15.3 -12.4
Other industries -20.1 -8.8 -7.8 -16.5 -6.1 -8.1 -2.1 -3.2 3.6 -6.0 2.9 -14.1 1.2 -19.8 0.8 -15.9 -4.3 -9.0
Service -15.8 -10.4 -5.0 -7.4 5.1 9.4 46.3 25.3 35.1 17.7 16.8 29.0 22.6 14.1 16.3 -9.7 25.6 3.9
Total -21.8 -11.8 -12.5 -3.5 -0.5 -2.4 -15.8 -6.5 -6.7 -2.6 -3.3 -6.0 -7.3 -3.1 -4.0 -12.0 -8.4 -10.2
Agriculture -10.8 -6.2 -5.6 -3.9 -2.3 -2.3 -1.0 1.7 6.9 -1.8 0.3 1.4 -2.0 1.3 0.2 -6.3 -1.1 -5.1
All energy -14.0 -28.2 -3.0 -7.8 7.6 -5.6 -0.2 10.7 -6.5 -3.1 -3.0 -3.9 -8.7 -3.4 -11.1 -14.5 -6.3 -8.2
All manufacturing -6.6 -6.5 -3.4 -1.3 -2.4 -2.5 -3.4 -3.2 3.0 -2.3 -4.2 -2.4 -4.9 -1.8 -2.5 -4.8 -3.2 -4.0
Energy intensive manufacturing -7.8 -14.1 -8.7 -10.0 -0.9 -4.2 -3.3 -0.7 2.8 -0.4 0.6 -1.2 -1.6 0.5 -0.4 -8.8 -1.4 -5.7
Other manufacturing -5.9 -3.4 -1.9 4.7 -2.8 -1.8 -3.5 -4.1 3.2 -2.7 -4.9 -3.3 -5.9 -3.6 -3.3 -3.2 -3.7 -3.5
Other industries -5.7 -2.5 -2.3 -12.6 -2.0 -0.6 -1.6 0.6 1.9 -0.2 -0.1 -1.8 -0.9 -1.5 4.5 -6.8 0.1 -2.7
Service -5.2 -4.8 -0.8 -2.9 3.4 6.8 6.9 3.3 13.2 7.9 6.9 7.5 5.2 6.6 14.3 -3.3 6.8 0.6
Total -6.6 -6.9 -3.1 -3.2 -1.4 -2.1 -2.7 -1.4 -2.1 -1.4 -1.9 -1.4 -2.0 -1.3 -3.8 -5.0 -2.2 -3.6
Agriculture -3.3 -1.9 -6.9 -0.7 -4.3 -3.0 -2.4 -4.1 6.6 -2.8 -3.6 -0.7 -6.2 -0.4 -0.8 -1.9 -2.6 -2.0
All energy -0.5 -1.8 -6.1 -4.4 2.6 -9.2 -4.4 -3.3 -6.8 -4.6 -4.6 -6.0 -9.7 -3.4 -8.2 -2.0 -6.2 -5.2
All manufacturing 0.5 0.0 -1.7 3.5 -2.8 -0.6 -1.8 -2.1 1.8 -1.7 -3.4 -3.2 -4.3 -2.0 0.6 -0.5 -2.0 -1.2
Energy intensive manufacturing 4.1 0.7 -2.6 9.6 -5.8 -6.0 -7.0 -6.4 -0.4 -5.9 -8.7 -5.9 -8.6 -5.3 -4.8 1.4 -6.3 -1.9
Other manufacturing -1.2 -0.3 -1.5 -0.8 -2.0 1.9 -0.9 -0.6 5.0 -0.6 -2.6 -1.2 -3.1 0.5 2.8 -1.2 -0.8 -1.0
Other industries -2.5 0.7 -3.0 -0.5 -2.2 -2.4 -2.3 -5.5 4.2 -1.5 -0.7 -0.9 -3.7 0.5 2.9 -1.5 -1.6 -1.5
Service -6.6 -8.5 -0.9 -8.2 6.0 13.2 11.0 6.9 19.7 12.5 10.3 13.3 7.8 12.3 19.0 -4.8 10.6 1.1
Total -1.6 -1.8 -1.7 0.4 -1.3 -1.4 -1.0 -0.7 -2.2 -0.7 -0.9 -1.7 -1.0 -0.5 -0.8 -1.4 -1.0 -1.2
Agriculture -9.2 -4.2 -4.6 -2.8 -1.9 -1.6 2.5 4.2 15.4 -0.3 -2.1 4.8 0.6 4.9 2.2 -4.6 0.6 -3.4
All energy -11.9 -23.4 -5.3 -9.9 7.4 -3.9 2.5 6.2 -2.9 -4.0 -4.4 -0.2 -9.0 -3.0 -8.5 -13.3 -4.4 -6.5
All manufacturing -5.8 -3.7 -4.4 -0.1 -1.0 -1.8 -3.2 -3.0 -9.9 -1.1 -1.7 -5.5 -3.5 -3.6 -0.3 -3.5 -2.9 -3.2
Energy intensive manufacturing -3.2 -7.0 -6.9 0.4 -3.8 -8.9 -39.6 -19.1 -26.0 -11.7 -23.5 -20.9 -21.1 -14.6 -12.3 -4.3 -23.6 -12.5
Other manufacturing -7.1 -2.3 -3.7 -0.5 -0.2 1.4 3.5 2.9 12.2 1.5 1.4 5.9 1.4 4.5 4.6 -3.1 3.0 0.0
Other industries -5.9 -2.8 -2.3 -14.5 -3.3 2.1 4.2 1.4 7.1 0.6 1.7 0.8 2.6 6.5 7.3 -7.5 3.5 -1.0
Service -4.6 -3.3 -0.2 -2.1 1.2 4.4 6.0 2.7 16.2 6.5 4.8 10.5 3.8 6.4 10.2 -2.9 5.7 0.4
Total -5.8 -4.3 -4.1 -2.7 -0.5 -1.4 -2.4 -1.4 -3.7 -0.7 -0.8 -2.2 -1.3 -1.2 -2.0 -3.9 -1.8 -2.9
Agriculture -5.9 -2.8 -3.2 -0.7 -1.5 -1.5 -0.4 1.2 7.3 -1.2 -1.5 1.0 -1.2 2.4 1.5 -2.8 -0.3 -2.2
All energy -9.8 -20.8 -3.8 -7.7 8.7 -1.6 0.2 6.5 -5.2 -3.5 -3.9 -2.0 -9.7 -3.0 -7.7 -11.0 -4.7 -6.2
All manufacturing -3.3 -3.4 -2.6 -1.6 -1.0 -1.8 -1.5 -1.3 2.0 -0.7 -1.0 -1.5 -1.8 -0.1 0.3 -2.6 -1.2 -1.9
Energy intensive manufacturing -3.9 -10.6 -6.0 -6.7 -2.2 -7.6 -7.7 -3.2 -0.2 -2.9 -3.0 -3.2 -4.0 -1.9 -6.6 -6.1 -4.8 -5.5
Other manufacturing -3.1 -0.5 -1.6 1.9 -0.7 0.7 -0.4 -0.6 4.9 -0.1 -0.7 -0.2 -1.2 1.2 3.2 -1.2 -0.1 -0.7
Other industries -2.8 -1.6 -1.3 -12.4 -2.4 2.5 1.2 1.5 3.5 0.8 0.6 0.3 1.3 3.9 6.2 -5.2 2.4 -0.7
Service -2.8 -2.5 0.2 -0.8 0.8 3.7 2.9 0.1 10.4 4.7 3.3 5.0 1.8 4.0 9.1 -1.8 3.3 0.1
Total -3.5 -3.8 -2.3 -2.8 -0.6 -1.2 -1.2 -0.6 -1.7 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 -0.5 -1.6 -2.8 -1.0 -1.9







Notes: NBTA17:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and take no trade policy action;  BTAFU:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and impose tariffs on all merchandise imports based on carbon content in imports; 
BTADU:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and impose tariffs on all merchandise imports based on carbon content in domestic production;  BTADE:Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% with import tariffs on all 
merchandise imports and rebates on all merchandise exports based on carbon content in domestic production;  BTAFR: Industrial countries alone reduce emissions by 17% and impose tariffs on energy-intensive merchandise imports based on carbon 















































Agriculture 1.7 1.2 1.1 2.1 1.3 6.2 6.2 13.2 4.3 5.2 14.8 8.9 5.9 8.9 5.3
All energy 3.1 4.0 2.7 5.8 5.2 8.3 7.1 9.8 24.1 9.5 7.7 22.2 23.4 10.6 9.3
All manufacturing 35.3 23.9 31.8 25.9 42.2 33.9 49.8 35.4 23.8 47.5 31.5 24.4 24.3 29.3 41.3
Energy intensive manufacturing 11.1 7.2 10.0 9.2 13.0 11.5 15.7 10.9 10.7 10.7 4.7 8.9 7.4 9.8 12.6
Other manufacturing 24.3 16.8 21.8 16.7 29.1 22.3 34.1 24.5 13.1 36.8 26.8 15.5 16.9 19.5 28.7
Other industries 5.9 7.0 7.5 8.8 6.5 8.9 10.9 8.5 8.5 7.1 8.4 9.0 7.7 7.5 5.4
Service 53.9 63.9 56.9 57.3 44.9 42.8 26.0 33.1 39.3 30.7 37.6 35.5 38.7 43.6 38.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0































Agriculture 0.8 3.7 0.1 4.1 0.1 10.4 1.1 3.7 0.6 1.7 3.4 4.3 1.9 7.9 6.2
All energy 2.5 2.2 0.3 10.0 2.3 4.3 2.0 3.6 52.9 7.1 9.7 24.7 49.4 34.6 17.8
All manufacturing 69.4 69.5 90.3 66.6 77.3 68.5 89.9 69.7 36.0 79.6 70.5 53.0 32.6 37.7 61.4
Energy intensive manufacturing 20.6 19.0 17.5 21.6 16.9 20.6 12.0 19.3 25.4 14.0 4.6 25.7 11.4 17.4 15.0
Other manufacturing 48.8 50.5 72.8 45.1 60.5 47.8 78.0 50.4 10.5 65.6 65.9 27.2 21.2 20.3 46.4
Other industries 1.8 0.9 1.1 3.6 0.2 7.2 0.6 5.0 3.4 1.6 0.7 2.8 1.8 7.4 3.1
Service 25.5 23.8 8.3 15.6 20.0 9.6 6.4 18.0 7.2 10.1 15.8 15.2 14.3 12.5 11.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Appendix Table 8. Share of Exports by sector (% of total exports, 2005)